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CHAPTER I
Ilrl'RODUCTIOH TO.,WILliUJol
JAMES
"
'.'
'

The purpose ot this thesis

i.~
"I',

.. :.~

,an '.~po.i tion of William Jamea"
-,

notion ot concept as proposed in tbePrinciples £! 'sycholoR and
aa developed, by Jame.ta adoption ot

~'dical

empiricism, in Some

The scope ot the thesia will be contined

Problems g! Philosophl.

to only two ot the tour general tielda into which the writings of
Jame. tall: namely, the fields of psychology and of the philosophy

ot radical empiricism.

Pragmati •• will be included only in as

much as it further. the development ot the notion of concept in
radical empirici...

The fourth f1eld, that of James'. religioua

writings, bas no direct 8ignifioance on the theais topic .nd vill
not be oonsidered.
Jame.'s philosophical temperament and ide.8 oannot be understood properll. nor his difficulties and problems properly appreoiated, without a briet orientation to his empirical background.
It is necessary, theretore, to consider the ide.s and the men vho
influenced William James.
Jame. began his acientitic studies at Harvard's Lawrence Scientitic School in 1861 at the age ot nineteen.
va. ch••istry, but this

800n

His tirst interest

turned to biology, physiology, and
1

2

medical studies.

Porced by ill health to abandon hi. studies at

Harvard, James went to Europe.

He~e.

in between rest cure. and

medical ai4, he tried to continue hisph,.,ioloQ studies.

At thia

time, too, he turned to psychologJ', a.~be wrote that "it .eell.8 to
~,

Iciel1ce, • . . 1 am going on to

.~u.dy

,.:

wbat is already known, and

perhaps may b8.able to clo some work in 1t.

aelmhol t. and a man

named WUDdt at Heidelberg are workIng at it, and I hope I live
through this winter to go to them In the summer,,,l
When James graduated trom Harvard with a medioal degree in

1869, he had studied all the aoiencea then known that dealt with
man in his physical and psychical make-up.

Bttt these ,tud1., bad

lea. peraonal influence on him than did his teacher..

!WO men,

Jettrie. Wyman, prote.,or of comparative anatom,. and ph7,iologJ,
and Lqp1. Ala•• il, protelsor ot leolo,gr, Jamel oreditl tor their
1napira*ion and help.

These men creat_d a soientit1c attItude at

Harvard that was oontemporary and prophetic, and It "waa thil emanCipating influence, among all the torces ot hia time and plaoe,
that mOlt deep1,. aftected William Jame. during the ,ears of hl,
uni.er,it,. studie •• ,,2 Suoh a baokground and the ingrained scient1tic approach ot his teachers early committed James to an a.pir1laalph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William
Jamel (Boaton, 1935), II, ~
---2,oid. I, 205.

l
cal approach to psyoholo87 and Ph11osophy.)
In 1872, James began his teaching career at Haryard as an instructor in anatomy and physio1ogr.

By now, however, his intere.tl

were in psychology, and ln 1876 he organlzed the tlrst psycho1og1cal

laborato~

at Harvard.

The suooe.s ot this laboratopy brought

Jame. the reputation ot being one ot Amerlca'. leading P87cho1ogilts, even though there was much dlspute about the new physiological psychology he prote.sed. 4
At this time Jam.s began to prepare the materlals tor hls
Principles

~

PSlcholoSl, whioh was not published until 1890.

In

this book he make. reterenoe to the men who influenced him during
the •• ,.eara.

The dootrine. ot suoh men as Helmholtl, Wundt, Feoh-

ner, and Stumpt, ot the German Ichool, ot Charoot and Janet ot the
Prenoh school; ot Bain, Carpenter, J. S. Mill, Darwln, Taine, and
Spencer, ot the Brltilh group, tlgur., prominentl,. ln Jame.'. p.,.Oholog,..S

The unlquene.. and importa~e ot James as the t~under

ot Amerioan psyohology .temmed trom his ability to ohoo.e and piok
what he thought good in the oontinental psyohologist. while adapting the. into his own evolving .,.stem.

Perry write. that "he

benefitted by the new movements in German, Prenoh and English psy-

J!!!!.,

468.

4Ibid., II, 6.
5Gardner Murph,., Historloal Introduction
(New York, 1949), p. 19~.

!it

Modern PSloholorq

4
oholoQ without surrenderlng himself wholly to any ot them."6
Bven at thia tlme Jameats philosophical interests were beg1nn1ns to absorb him.

Among the men who inf'luenoed Jame.,

Per~f

aa7.

that aenou.vler was "the greatest slngl. influence upon James'.
thought,but though

Renouvi.~

was a protessed adherent of Kant,

Jame. prized hlm for h1s Kant1an here.les rather than tor hia t1delit1e •• "1 As a &roup, however, the Brltish empirioists, Locke,
Berkelef. Hume,

an~

Mill, appeared to James as being "intellectu-

ally, aa well as praotically and morally, on the saner, sounder,
and truer path. u8 Prom the tlme James began to write the Prinoiples, he was also in contact with philosophers in Amerioa and on
the continent.

Hil alsoolationa with Chaunoey Wriaht, Charles S.

Peiroe, and Josiab ROfoe were very olose.

or

the philosophera on

the continent Jame. write. that he would not bave been emancipated
from .any dilemmal he .aw "it I had

n~t

been intluenoed br a com"

paratlvelf fOung and very

o~l&inal

Jr ••eh wr1ter, Professor Henr1

Bergaon.,,9
With the ide.s of a newly developed 8cience in his mind and
with the stimUlation received from

cont~ct

with minds ot the past

6'e1'17, II, 6.
1~., I,

465.

8Wl11lam Jamel, "Philosophioal Conceptions and Praotioal Re.ulta," Colleoted E•• a,! and aeview., ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New
~ork, 19~), pp. 4l4-4

>.---

9wllliam J .... , A Plurali.tic Univer.e, ed. Ralph Barton Perr7
(New York, 1943), p. ~.

and present, Jame. was encouraged and eager to test empiricism to
soe it he could u.e it to an.wor the problema ho saw in philosoph7.
Jam•• law the world as it prelent~d itselt to him in all its complexit7,vltalit7, and ooncreteness.

Continult7 was one ot the

world's.oat striking characteristics which could not bo overlooked.

He oonstantl7 argued against those Ichooll ot thought

which lett the traditional chasma in tho world unbridged or tried
to bridgo them with elaborate .etaph78ical construotions. 10 Sine.
he saw the world in all itl tullnell, he strove to find a principle ot unity wIthin the pluralit7 that presented itselt.

He dId

not want a logical structure luperimposed trom without, but a common prInciple ot unit7 within the world ot h1s experience •.
When, theretore, James began writing and teaching in psychol087. he aimed at gathering all the data and intormation ho could
without correlatlng these within a

p~ilosoph1cal

tramework.

In

•

the pretace to the Principle., James 8a78 that the disou88ion ot
basie assumptions in psrcholo81 is metaph78ioal and is outside
the purpose ho intends.

"Thi8 book,fl he writes, flassuming that

thought. and teelings exist and are vehioles ot knowledge. there.
upon oontends that psyohology. when ahe baa asoertained the empirioal oorrelation ot the various aorts ot thougt or tee ling with
detinite conditions ot the brain. oan go no tarther--can go no
farther that is, as a natural science.

It she goos tarther ahe

6
beoomes metaphysical. nIl
With this view ot psychology in mind, James rejeoted the assooiationist and

spl~itualist

theories ot psychology. 'The

asso~

ciationlst assumption that sensations are the simplest mental
tacta 18 contrary, he thought, to the empirical method of invest1gation. 12 James had some inclinations toward the spiritualist the ..
ory, but he determined to pre.clnd trom them.

ffIfit does not

str1ctly exelain anrthing, it is at any rate les8 positively objectioaabl. than e1ther mind-stutf or a material-monad creed.

The

bare PHENOMENON, however t l!1! IMMEDIATELY KNOWN thing which
msnt~l

!!!! !! !! apposition

~

]h! entire brain-process

---_

state of consciousness and not the soul ....................
it.elt. hl)

.;:..;;;.;;..;...;;;.-

-.2.!l19!.

~

lh!

Jame •• the~.-

tore, chose a strictly positivistio point of view whioh he admittedwaa anything but ultimate.
must be gathered betore any

Hovever, be telt that all the taot.

satistac~ory

metaphysioa1 explanation
"

could be had.

Hls book "is mainly a mass ot desoriptive details,

running out into queries which only a metaphysics alive to the
weight ot her task can hope sucoessfully to deal vith. ftl 4
iPom Jamesls oonsiderations during the writing ot the Prinei-

Rl•• we can

see that philo8opbJ was his ultimate goal.

11Will1am James,
I, vl.

-

12Ibld.,

-

224.

1)Ibid., 182.
l4Ibid., v1.

~

Principle.

~

He could

PSlchologz (New York, 1890),

7
not pest with a merely scientific psychology.

In the epilogue to

his PSlcholoSl, the briefer course, published in 1892, James discussed psychology and philosophy.

Hero he again admits the inabil-

ity ot psychology a. a natural science to giv6 ultimate answers.
Here, too, he posed the proble.s that would force him to develop
a

phIlosophy ot his own.

He

telt that "the metaphysical puzzle.

beoome the most urgent one. ot all.

Psychology contributes her

tull share of these; and I p1"opose in this last chapter to 1ndicat. brietly which ot them .eem the more tmportant. ftl5
The.e problems involve the correspondence ot two mutually
distinot realIties suoh as we have In the l"elatlO,nshlp of knower
and known, thought and thing, conoept and percept.

In his PsZ-

Choloal James adopted psycho-physioal parallelism as a working hypothesi. to serve psychology a8 a natural scienoe.
however, when he considered the

phil~sophical

He admitted,

implications, th.at
"

the correspondence ot the entire state'of' the brain to a uniqae
state ot the mind "do •• very well till we begin to be metaphysioal
and ask ourselves Ju.t what we mean by such a word a8
ponda. t "16

Jamests problem., therefore, become oong~u.nt in an

tort to explain this
ties.

fco~~e.

cor~.8pondenoe,

.f-

this union ot distinct reali-

Hi, problem become. one ot tinding a unifying principle tor

,ubjeot and object, thought and thing, concept and percept, in the

15Wliliam Jam•• , P810h01081, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (Oleveland. 1948), p. 462.

-

16Ib1d •

8
knower-known relationship.

In other words, a subject has thoughts

and concepta, the objeot ls a thing thought and a peroept conceiyed, how can these dualities be unified in a basic common reality'
From this statement of Jame.'s gen.ral problem, it is clear
that the specific problem of this th.sls, James's notion ot concept, is a part of his wider problem,

Here the problem is ot cor-

respondence between concepts, which are discontinuous, immutable,
and eternal, and the constantly changing, continuous tlow ot experienoe.

How oan these distinct realitie. be unitied?

In the

exposition of James'. notion ot concept, theretore, it will be
necessary to touch on hls solution ot the broader problem.
In the division ot this thesis the second chapter wlll discuss James's analysis ot the elements ot consciou.ness in the
stream ot thought.

From this analysis arises, tor James, the pos-

sibility ot knowledge.

Following thia necessary orientation, the
.,

concept as a partIcular type of knowledge will be pre.ented and
developed.

This chapter will consider Jame.'s notion ot concept

from the vantage point ot psychology.

The third chapter wl1l deal

with the tormulation and deyelopment ot radioal empiricism'. philosoPh1 ot pure experience as the unifying principle which James
proposed as the solution to the general problem, and to the problem ot the peroeptual and conceptual worlds.

Pragmatism will be

disoussed a8 a special teature of radical empir1cisM in regard to
the meaning and truth of ooncepts.

A discussion of how pure ex-

perience solves the problems ot the concept and enriche. the no-

~------------------------------------------------------------~

9
tion ot concept will be the matter of the tC'Jurth chapter.
general conclusions,

eonside~atlons,

Some

and comparisons with scholas.

tic notions of concept will make up thetitth and final ohapter.

CHAPTEft II
OONCEPT AS FOUND AND DBVEtOPED

~.

THE PRINCIPLES

In the Prinoiple., as we lndicate'din the tirst ohapter,
James proposed to treat psyohology as a natural .cienoe which

"a.~

sum.s a. It. data 1) thoughts !a£ tee1iggs, and 2) a phlsloal
world in time and spaoe with which they coexist and which 3) thel
The.e three are the t aots ot mental lite that Jame. will
-know."l
de.l with in his .tudr ot p.rohologr. There are, however, other
h1poth•••• which James postulat •• as usetul tor the tull understanding ot the intrioate workings of tinite mental aotlvlt7.
James's first hypothe.is oonsidered mants mental faoulties as
instruments adapted to seoure satety and prosperIt7 In the complex.
itT ot the world.

The oonsequent Interaction resulting b&tween tht

world and manta conscious activity brought James to an opinion,
which showa Darwin'. Influence, that "mind and world • • • have
been evolved together, and in oonsequence are something ot a mutual tit."2 The chiet result or this evolutionary view ot .ental

I,

lwi11iam James,

1'i.

Ie! PrInciples £! PSlcholoSl (New York, 1890),

2willlam James, PSloholoSl, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (Cleveland, 1948), p. 4.

10

u
lite 1s "the gradually growing conviction that mental lite is primarily teleological; that is to

8a~,

that our varlous ways ot

reeling and thinklng have grown to b. what they are because ot
their utility in shaping our reactions on the outer world. H3
A

.econd hypothesis whioh Jame. postu1at.d tor h1me.lt in wr1-

ting the Prlnoie1.. was "that ••ntal actlon may be unlformly and
abaol"tel, a t\lDctlon ot brain-action. ...arylng as the latt.r varies, and being to the braln-actlon as ottect to cause."4 fbi.
last hJpothe.ls is fundamental to the phy.lological p.,cho1ogy tor
which James bad been preparing him.o1t tor years.
Even thauah J . .es admitted that the •• two postulat •• were
on11 working bypoth•• es, and although he adapted and 11mited the.
over t he year., his empiricism forced hlm to treat the •• postulate.
a8 tacts ot experlence.

In tact, much ot Jamests later philoso-

phizlng wal an attempt to tit the

ta~ts

ot common ••n •• experience

Into the tramework ot the •• hypoth•••• ,· d•• pite hi. prote.tation
that he wi.hed to avoid all a rtlt1cial tramework••
Betore Jame. began hi. torma1

I

tud1 ot the olements ot con-

sclousne.s and Intellection, he made a tew observatlons on the
mind as an object In a world ot other objeots that has relatlonships wlth tho.e other objects.

Even though Jame', the psycholo-

gist, con.idered the relatlon ot knowing to be "the most mJsterl-

4Ibid., 6.
310id.

12

oua thing 1n the

wo~ld,

it is an ultimate relation that must be

admitted whether it be explained or not."'

Theretore, the pay-

cholog1.t's attitude toward cognition must be a complete dualis.
whioh aupposes two elements, mind knowing and thing known, and he
must treat the. as irreducible.
Subject and

Thus, "the dualism ot Objeot and

pre.established harmonr are what the psyoholo-

thei~

giat as suoh . .at aa ..._, whatever ulterior monistic philoaopb7
he .a,..

&8

an individual who haa the right to be a metaph,.sician,

bave in reaerve.,,6
James began his ps,.chology ot intellection with an introspective anal1sis ot the ele.ents ot consciousness,

This analr.

sis gave rise to his Itream ot conlciou.ne.s, which was one ot
James'l origlnal oontrlbutlons to psychology_

Much ot the data

presented In this anal,.sia had been gathered over the ,.ears and
had been published in outline torm in. 1884 in an article entltled
"On So.e Omissiona ot Introspective Pa,chologr."
Betore beginning his ana17sia, Jamea looked tor the primary
datu ot experience.

He thought he tound thls ele..ntlU7 tact In

the "conerete tact whlch e.err one w1l1 aftirm to belons to his
inner experience, • • • the tact that .c.on.8.0.1.0.u.8.n.8.8.8
rStates ot

-.

~ndt

~

succeed eaoh other in him.
............

p

-...-.-

!!!! !S£!
It W8

could .a1 in English '1t thInks,' • • • we should be stat1ng the

>;.... ,

-

Prinoiple. I, 216.

6Ibid ., 220.

13
tact moat simply and w1th the minimum of assumption."7
Proc •• ding empirically 1n h1s analfsis, James noted fiye
characteri.tics ot the .procels

o~tho\lght%

that every thc>ught

seems to be part ot a personal conSOi0118ne8a; that thought 1s
always changing within each personal e01'l8oiousnelsJ that thought
1a senalbly concinuous within each.personalconaciousnessJ that
thought deal. with objects independent

or

itselt; that thougat,

finally, 1. interested in lome parts ot its objects to the exclusion at other part •• 8
Taking up the first

point, James writes that "it s ••ms as It

the el •••ntaPy psychic tact were not thossht or
~

!h!!

thought or

thousht, but ! l thossht, eyery thought being owned."9 Thi.

psyohic tact brings men to admit a personal mind or selt whOle
existenoe cannot be questioned.

This personal .elf is not a per-

manent SUbstance underlying thought. :. It is nothing essentiall,.
d1fterent tram anything to be tound 1Drthe procesalon ot changing
thoUghts. lO
Jame.'. lecond characteristic ot thought 1. that

.2!!!!. lione .!!!l recur ~ ~ identical !!!!h. what
7James, PSIchololl, p. 152.

-

8Ib1d •

9James, ~rinclpl.8 I, 226.
lOIbld., 226-227_
11~., 2)0.

"~_s_ta_t_e_

.u .!!!. betore. ,,11

In other words, the same senaation once had can never be telt again.

It there seems to be a sameness in two difterent states of

consciousness, this doe. not come from the sensation repeated, but
from the same object gotten twice. l2
This 1s true, because, on introspection,
is not quite the same as it was before.

th~

same sensation

The same object may be

sensed,butthe new relations and context cbange, to some degree,
the original senaation.

This tollows from the assumption that

every sensation corresponds to .ome cerebral action.

Since the

is being constantly modifled. there must be a corresponding
change in the concomitant sensation. l ) Each new state ot the

brai~

brain is determined DT the state. that have preceded it, so tht.
growing modification makes Identical sensations impossible.

Jame.

concluded, theretore, that "experience ia remoulding us eveP1 mo.ent, and our mental reaction on e.er.r given thIng is real11 a
resu.ltant of our experIence ot the who'!e world up to that "date. "14
It 1. this theory ot experienoe, based on pa,slologlcal data,
that made it impossible tor James to tollow either Locke or Herbart, who "formulate the mental tacts in an atomiatic

8o~t

ot wa7.

and treat the higher states ot consciousness .s it the, were all
bu.ilt ou.t of unchanging ideas • • • • These ideas are !.!. ntho-

-

12Ibld., 231.

-

l'Ibld •• 233.
lll-Ibid.,
2)6.
,

1S

~o,loal !n ent1t% !! 1b! J!Ok i! spades. ftlS It psycb?lociata do
not anal,..e the elements of consciousness, but assume this atomlstio viewpoint, the result "1. the Humlan doctrine that our thought

1s composed of separate Independ9nt parts and il not a sensibly
continuous ltl'e. . . ,,16
James bec1ns bis analya!. ot the third oharacter1stic

or

thought by detlnlnc "'continuous' as that whtcb. 1s without breach,
oraok or div1s1on,_l1
in thought.

Intro.peetlon reveala two types

or

breaks

Thore could be time-saps between Itat •• ot oonscious-

ne.1 1 tor example, the lap•• ot consciousness during sl.ep.
there could be a qual1tative break so

stro~~

Or

that two .ucc•• ding

atat•• or oonsoiouane.s had no conneotlon whatever.

But intra-

.paot1on also :re.e.ls two thIns' about the.e br!'aka: "1. That
e.en where there 1. a time-sap the coneolousness atter it t.els
as it it belonged together with the

~on.olou.n.'8

before 1t, .a
"

another part ot the same selt, 2. That:'the chang•• from one moment to another in the quality ot the consoiousness are never
abaolute1r abrupt."18

In anaIr.ing the first of the two breaks, the t1me-gap, J ....
reoognized the tact that, though ooneo!oueness 18 broken, 1t 1a
1510\4., 2..36.
161b1<1., 231.
111)14.

lSzo14.

16
not broken 80 oompletely that thero 1s a DeW .ett who cannot
member a paat exiatence.

~e

Thi. uni t1 amid aenalb11 continuous

001'1-

sciouaness Jame. attributed to tbe unity ot a common selta
This oommunlt7 or .elt 18 ~~t the time-gap oannot br.ak
11'1 twaln, and i8 wbJ • present tho~t, although not 11norant ot the time-gap, can stl11 regard It.elf 8S continuous with certain chosen portions ot tbe paat.
Conaciousness, then, does not appear to itsolt
chopped up 1n b1te. Such words .a 'chain' or 'train'
do not dese:rlbe 1t .titlJ as it presents ltselt in the
tl~.t lnatanoe.
It 1. nothing jo1nted; it flows. A
'r!yez-' or • 'aa-eam' are the metapllors bY' which 1t ta
moet natural11 de.oribed. In talkl~ ot II bareatter,
lot U8 call 1t
,tre, .e! ttiougfi~
conscloWlnes,J.I
.2£ C"u§J:eotrv! .=,W.. t

'hI

~bo.e

or

who would claim tbat the .eoond t7Po ot break 11'1 con-

t1nult1. tbe sudden oontrasts 11'1 tho qualit,y ot thought, ao alters oonsoiousn••• that it 1. completely dirterent are 8uilt7 ot
contuslon, or ot "•••perticial introspective y1ew. w20 The contuslon here i. between the thoughts the.. elye., which, taken .a
8ubjeotiye tacta, are continuous, and the tbiftga, whioh a•• d1e.'

crete and discontinuoua,

"tba tranait10n between the thought ot

one obJeot and the thought ot another 1. no roore a break 1n the

thoWl than a J01nt 1n a bamboo is a break 11'1 the wood.

I t i.

part ot the consci6usness a8 muoh a. the joint 1. part ot the
bamboo. nIl

.0 matter bow v10lent tbe ohange ot thought nor how complete.
19Ib1d., 239.

2Otb1!!., 240.
21Ibid,

11
11 dltterent the termini ot tbe thought, tbe change 1.

~adual.

This 1. true because "aa tbe total neurosis change., so doe. tbe
total psychosls ohange.

But.a the change. of neurosis are naVel'

absolute11 dlsoontlnuous, so muat the sucoe.slve psyobo.e. shade
graduall1 1nto eaoh other, although tbeir rate of ohange mar be
muob taster at one moment tban at the next."22 The supertlclal
introspect!"• •1ew bas overlooked th._ atfinitles that are present
be~Y•• n dl~t.rent

here top

~e

tboughts.

EYen our lansuase work. againat U8

name oup thoughts staplr, eaob

at~er

1t • .&oh. kn• ., t. t. own tbing aM nothing .l.e.

What

it. tblng, .s
e8Gb real11

knows 1. 01e.r11 the tb1nS 1t 1. named top, with cU.II11 perhaps
a

thouaand other tb1nga. n2)
'fbi. ihaight is a flash ot Ja.s's 8-1u, and one ot hi.

primal'1 oontrlbutions to the analfsis ot oonsclouan•• e.
insiaht led Jam.. to two

oonslderatl~.

!bi.

wbich were important tor

hi. p.,obololJ ot thousht, and oon•• qu'ntly ot oonceptlon.

!he••

two 001181d.1'8tl01'18 are. (1) the wanaitl.e and. eub.tantl.e pute
ot consclouene.8, and (2) the trlna- of oon.oiousn....

Baoh of

th•• e will b. taken up and developed in turn.
Jame., analJ'alnc tb. thoUSbt p!'Oc••• , cOllPared. 1t vl tb the
tllabt ot a bad .ade ot flan a1 tenatloD ot tllabte and perohing••-1+

22]:1»14. , 2!,3.
231b14., 241.
241b1d. , 243.
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He described this more full,. when he wrote that "the restingplaces are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some
sort, whose peculiarity is that th.,. can be held before the mind
tor an indefinite time, and contemplated without changing; the
place. ot flight are tilled with thoushts ot relations, statio
or dynamic, that tor the most part 'obt'td,ln between the matter contemplatea in the periods of compa~atlv. rest."as Substantive
part. is the name given to the resting-place., and the places ot
flight are called the transitive parts ot the stream.
It i. almost impossible to recognize these trans!tive parts
ot the stream trom introspection.

The process of thought usually

rushes on to the substantive parts so quickly that the transitlve
parts cannot be tocused on.

It tbe psyohologist succe.ds In lso-

lating a transitlve part, in that very act it becomes a substant!ve part.
Because ot this Inability to tindthe tranaitive parts ot
the stream through. introspection, the sensationalists and intelleotualists denied their exiltence.

The lensatlonallsts, unable

to dlscover any t •• lings corr •• ponding to the relations and torms
ot connection in the world, denied th&t teelinas ot relation exi.t.

Hume even went

10

tions out ot the mind.

tar as to deny that thore are any relaThe intellectualists, on the other hand,

could not deny the realit,. ot these external relationa, but they

19
oould not pOint out any distinct relations actually exIsting.
they. too, denied that these tee lings of relations exist. 26

So

James.s reaction to these erroneoua positions was a strong
atfirmation that "it there be suoh things as tee1ings at all, then
!2 sure11 a! relations between objeots exist

!a rerum

natura, A2

.!.2£!. surelI, ~ feel ips. exist !.2. whioh these £.!l!...;...,;;,00_ n21
tions are knovn.
Jame. had named the.e switt motions of con-

surell,

~

...;;;.;;;........._ _

,;0;;;;;•

aolousness transitive atates and compared their continuity to that

ot the brain.

"AI the brain-ohanges are oontinuoU8, so do all

these consclou.snes.es melt into each other like d.1ssolving views.
Properly they are bat one protracted consoiousness, one unbroken
stream. ,,28
There is another type ot unnamed "state ot consciousness"
which is just a8 important and just a8 cognitive a. the transItIve
states, and just .s maoh unrecognize4 by traditional psychologle ••
"

As an example ot tni •• econd, unnamed ,state, James oonsidered the
ettort to recall a torgotten name.

There is a gap that is to be

overcome, but it is a lap which i8 intense1} active.

The ettort

to reoa11, the tal ••• tart., the name on the tip-ot-the-tongu. are
signs ot this activity.

This activity led Jam.s to consider that

"the tee1ing of an ab.ence is

-

26Ibid.,

-

27Ibid.,

244-24S.
24S.

281bi4., 247-248.

!!i! coe10

other than the ab ••nc.

20

ot a tee1inc_n29

It 18 this teeling, activitr. or tendency that James considered so important.

Because oonsciousne.s la continuous. no one

part ot lt can be in complete laolationfrom the rest.
ment or

con8clo~.ne8s

prospective

Each ele.

contains ln It ••1f a retrospective and a

t.~d.no1.

In the present ana1ysls J&mes is discussing

the importance of this tendency_

Thi. second, unnamed state is directional.

It cons1at. ot

psychic transitions whose function is to lead trom one set ot image. to another.

Because ot its transitory character, just .s

that ot the transitive stat •• , it 1s lost in
it i8

none the less real.

int~ospeetion.

But

In fact, a good part ot our psychic

lite con.iats in .uch rapid premonitory perspective viewa of
80hemes of thought not yet articulate.)O
The •• "fe.1ings or tendencr." a., Jame. called them, are ot"

ten vague, but the,. are part ot a pictUre ot mental lit. which is
more oorrect than that of psyohologists who deny any except perfectly distinct imag...

James de.cribed hi. own po.it1on in eon-

treat with the traditional one when he wrote that:
The traditional psychology talks like one who should
say a river con.ists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful. quartpotsful, barrelsful. and other moulded torms
ot water. EYen were the pails and the pots all actual17 standing in the .tream, still b.tween them flows the
fre. water of consciousness that PS7ohologists re.olute-

lOIbid.,

29Ibld., 252.

-

2$3.
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17 oyerlook. Eyery detinite image in the mind is steeped
and dyed in the tr.e water that flow. round it. With
it goes the sen•• ot its relations, near and remote, the
dying echo 01.' whence it came to us, the dawning sens.
ot whither it is to lead. The signiticance, the value,
ot the image i8 all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it, --or rather that is tUled into one
wi'\thit and has beeo.. bone ot it., bone and tlesh 01.' its
tlesh, leaving it, it is true, an image ot the eame
it was before, but making it ',an 11Iase 01.' that
ng newly taken and freshly underatoad.Jl

itiM

James's p.ycho-phyaioal hypothesis led him to believe that
there was a corre.ponding physioal reaction to this psychic phenomenon.

Theretore he named thil state ot consciousness a "psychic

overtone," or a "fringe," in order "to designate the influence ot
a taint bre.in-proeess upon our thought, as it makes it aware ot
relations and objects but dimly pereeived."32
James loes on to list four important oharacteristics ct this
notion of the fringe of consciouaneae.

The tirst ot theae is that

there is a reason tor t he distinction, between knowledse 01.' aoquain
.,

tanee and knowledge-about.
two types of knowledge.

The Iringe:' Is what distinguishes these

When the tringe 1s present, lmowledge is

more complete.

This complete, knowledge-about 11 knowl.dge of the
relations ot a thing, and these are only found in the fringe. l )
This awareness of the object's relations, as Jame. atates, oome.
only in the "penumbral nasoent waT of a •fringe , ot unartloulated

-

.32I014 •• 2S8.
331014., 2$9.

affinitIes about It. n34
This sense ot atflnlty 1s a second feature
thought derived from the notien of the frlnge.

or

the stream ot

In all thinklng

there is some topic or subject about which the members of the
thought revolv8.

The relation oftbe other members to the topic

is felt in the fringe, and particularly the relat10n ot harmony
and discord. ot furtherance or hindrance ot th, topic.

It the re-

lation is haFmonious, it positively furthers the thought; 1t d1s·
oordant, it lnitiate. or continue. the search tor harmonious relat1ons.

If these relations lead us to the conolusion ot a train ot

thought, there is "meanins, or, as we say, the topic of thought."'!
Slnce .eaning is
relations used

~h.

most important part ot the stream, the var10w

to reach it are relativ.ly unimportant. 36

From this notion of meaning James formulated his idea that
thinking is only a teleologlcal instr,ument.

"The reader se •• 0,-

this time that it makes little or no ditterenee in what sort ot
mind-stuff, in what qualitJ of imagery, his thinking goes on.
only image.

+n~r~nslcBll1

!he

important are the halting-p1aoes, the

substantive conclusions, prOVisional or tinal. of the thought.
Throughout all the rest of tn. stream, the f •• lings ot relations
are everything, and the terms related almost naught.

-

34Ibld.

3'sIbld., 260.

-

36Ibid., 259-260.

These te.l-

lOIS ot relation, these psychic overtonea, halos, suffusions, OP
fringes about the terms may be the same in very different systeMs
of imagery.tt.37
With the notions of the transitive states and the fringe,

Jam.1I explains "the sensible contlnulty and l,lnity ot our thought

as contrasted with the apparent discreteness ot th& words, Images,
and other means by which it

~eems

to be oarried on.

their substantive element a there is ttransitive-

Between all

eonsclousnes~,

and the words and images are 'fringed,' and not as discrete as to
a carelese .iew they may se.m.").8
Tne amount of space James gives to the explanation of thought
as sensibly continuous warrants the detailed analYSis given aboT••
Also, what has been discussed above is the groundwork tor e more
complete discussion ot the concept.
Th.e fourth oharacter1.stic James .attributed to human thought
is that it appears to deal with. objects independent of itself.
Our common sense leads us to accept the extra-mental existence ot
the objeots of our mind

we perceive that ~th.r. are ~
human thoughts, each with the same objeets. tt39 In conneetion with
b.caus~

-

knowledge ot objeots independent of the mind. James discusses two
erronflOUS opinions prevalent at the time.

37Ibid., 269"

-

38Ibidv, 271,
39Ibid~

-

The first is "that the

retlective consciousness ot the .el.f is essential to tht> cognitIve
.function of thought."40

In other words, the wind, in order to

know, must expressly distinguish between the things which it knowe
and it.elt.

James denied this oonsciousness as essential to

thought, then added that "thous;ht mal, !ll!l!!!!.9. !l2l. in knowing,
discriminate between

12

Object ~ itsf>lf. T'4l

James also objected to those who misuse the word "object,"
and take it to indicate only the "substantil'e kernel or nucleus
of the conseiousness."42

For example. tn the sentence flColumbus

discovered Amel'iea in 1492,"

1110St

people would say that the objeot

of the mind is the word "Columbus," or

"America,~

or "disoovered."

James maintained that it was none of these, but th. entire .entence or context.

To get the proper object, each word of a .en-

tenee must b. aoneidered with. its fringed relations.
of every thought, then , is neither

~or.

"The object

nor lese than all that

the thought thinks, exactly as the thought thinks it, however com-

pl1ce.t.d. the l\latter, and however symbolic the manner of the thInking may be."4J
Even if the objeot is oomplex. the thought of it is one undivided state ot consciousness.

40 1b1d., 274.
41 1b1d •• 275.

-

42Ibld.

-

4J 1bid • , 276.

-

James argued against

t~e

asso-

olatlonlsts who try to reach a unity out of the elementary distinot Ideas.

Thero was a foreshadowing ot gestalt psychology pre-

sent when James insisted t1:lat "whatever things !!!.!. thouSht

!.e. !:!....

!h!. outset in !. unlt;r, 1.!!..! sinele puIs.
!2!. sUbJecj:1.vi ty, !. 81nsl~ E-s:rohos 1s, fefl11np;, .2!: stat!t .of ~. ,,44,
lation !£.!. thoue,h.!? !!:.2!Tl

This unity of the entlro thought tR
sentence.

.'.

l?r~gent

in each word of the

Though each word is discrete, the fringe of the word

as spoken in the sentence continues the unity of meaning.

"No

word in an understood sentence comes to consciousness as a mere
noIse.

We feel its meaning as it passes; and although our object

differs from one moment to 9nother as to its verbal kernel or nuclaus, yet it 1s s1milar thPoughout the entire segment of the
stream. ,,4S

The reason for this un:tt~.. lles in the consubstantiall-

ty of the individual words and the entire meaning.

"They are made

ot the eame 'mind stuff,' and form a~ unbroken etream. n46
The flfth and final character1 stU~
is always interested more in one part
other,

a~d

thinka.,,47

o~

o~

the etream is that flit

its object than in an-

welcomes and rejects, or ohooses, all the while It
Just as each sensation is seleoted from an "undis-

tingulshable, swarming oontinuum, devoid of distinotion or emphaT

44Ibid. , 278.
4.$Ibid., 281.

-

46Ibid. , 282.

-

47Ibid. , 284.

••
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818,.48 by our sense organs, so thG mind chooses to suit itself,
and decides what partIcular sensation shall be helc.

valid than all the rest.

:~i()rC

real and

The mind 1rJorks on the matter of thought,

the chaos of sensatIons, as a sculptor work.

011

a stattlo.

"The

-

world we feel and live in will be tha.t which our ancestors and we,
by slot.fly cumulative strokes ot' choice, have extl"icated
out ot
':
th1s, 11ke sculptors, by simply re jecting c,ertain po:r-tions of the

given 8tutf.,,49

James's analysis of thought in the st:r-eam of
has been developed at some length.

pose ot this
all thought.

~esis,

eonsclous~ess

This 1s important for the pur-

because consciousness 1s the basic element of

From his

an~~ysI8

ot' thInking James concluded to the

possibility ot' knowledge.
The possibilIty ot' knowledge Is
liarity Which James named

mind's
.....-...-...

meani~s,'

~.~ ~

~.!2!!

~

.!!!

llrl na1ple

2! eonstanc.z 1!:! !h!

exp~essed:

suceessi ve I?orti?ns

these portions .£!!!

1m ~~lch ~

fundamental psychl0 pecu-

and which may be thus

be thoui2ht

.2!

It'!h.!.

P.

~

that they

othE'?!: Eortions meant.' ,.SO

'The
same ...........
mat.........................--.

.2!. lli

_!ll....
e .....
n_tB_l.....

~ ~ ~

stream,

!!!1-

James insisted that this

is a psyehologiea1 prInciple which the mind may use whether the!'e
be any real sameness 1n thinss or not.

48~.

49Ibid ., 289.

50Ib1d ., 459.

-

As far as mental lIfe goea,

bowever, "this sense

2! sameness is the very keel and backbone of

our thinking_"Sl
Once James has explained the possibility ot knowledge 1n the
stream by the identification

or

two thoughts as the same, he has

set the stage tor a discuasion ot two gen&l'al types of knowledge

ot which men are conscious, "knowledge 2! aCiuaintanee and
ledge-about.• ,,52 Knowledge ot aoquaintance is superficial.
a passing knowledge, a knowledge which knows
present, but not !h!1 it is.
complete.

It knows the

~

~

~

It is

an object is

Knowledge-about is deeper and more
of an object as well .s the !e!l-

James looked on knowledge of acquaintance as the beginning of cognition, and knowledge-about as its completion.

Knowledge-about

is gotten through anallsis ot and ooncentration on the fringe relationa ot the subject.
are conoepta.

The thoughts arising from knowledge-about

Knowledge of aoquaint-.nce, on th.e other hand, i. a-

kin to sensation or peroeption, and is,· "the knowledge more proper
to the stream.

Thus, Jame. oontended that "all the elementary na-

ture. of the world, together with the kinds ot relation that sub.ist between them, . .st either not be known at all, or known 1n
this dumb way ot acquaintanoe without knowledge.about."S)
James's emp1r1cism,acoording to Perrr, led him to conslder

-

511b1d.

-

521014.,

-

221.

S31bid., 221-222; also, ct. above pp. 19-20.

r __------------~
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human experience as narrower than human knowledge.

Thus, know-

ledge ot aoquaintanoe is within e.xperie~oe, and knowledge-about
passes beyond experience.
"~h1l.

Perry point. to James's contention that

both kinds ot knowledge. are indispensable, knowledge b,. ao-

quaintance 18 oompleter and more conclu.ive than knowledge-about,
"

~

the lat~er being a substitute or adj~ot .hich is required in order to overcome the l1mited range ot the tormer."54
James's detailed analysis ot consoiousness presented the elements common to thought and the groundwork ot knowledge.

From

this analr8is he explained how knowledge could arise through the
principle ot conltancy 1n the mind's meanings.

Atter his discuI-

sion ot two general types of knowledge, James is prepared to disCUIS

one particular type, knowledge-about, 'or coneept.
James defines oonception as "the tunction by whioh we thus

identit,. a numerioally distinct and
course. ,,55

p~rmanent

subject ot dis..

The subject of disoourse, therefore, becomes numerical-

11 distinct and permanent when it is marked ott from, or singled
out ot, the world ot complex experience,
conception to concept.

James preferred the word

For his, concepts were the thoughts which

are the .,.hlales ot oonception, but theJ' were not the objects ot
the disoourse.

"The word 'oonoeption,'" he wrote, "is unambiguou.••

It properly denote. neither the mental state nor what the mental
S4aalph Barton Perry,
Hayen, 1938), p. 45.

!s!S! Spirit £!

5>James, Prinolples I, p. 461,

William James (New
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.tate signifies, but the relation between the two,
t1l1'1otlon ot the mental state 1n

Sl~~l~*:~
-,' '.>' ,".

~.l11

the

just that partioular

':~":':').':'f

>6

0 n.oeJamea hal defined #~e~~~ion., he discusses its

thing. n

;~ ~'~}~:~' ,:~; 'j ~~~'~~; :~;~~:.

properties a,n4characteristics . , : · F " , · '

"

~

,

'".

". •...... . ' & ; ',·.,.;~,:L.:):

The (,t;tPlt.'pl'Opert1 ot
'

.

..":','""

oonoept.~~'·'·~'1 ts
!~.

<"/:-';.

,~,>")

It i.

, that is, Instead ot

one thlng:Qd "nothing el.e--nothiljg;

~Li;;·,·:~:~;;·,)t;

":";'-. ,.<:.:.,.".,::"',.' ,

u.n1quent.a.

that, tho~i\t'i,\;t:"'maT, be otmllch elsf~t.;lri:dltlon to that. u57,At..i.,

.: ',-," ;' '. "

~r~

'.(,' "

.":'\>~:"\

"

tention 8,j.tl!le. yd:u't and identitlescone?~~ement trom the mult.ipl1It focules

o1'1"t~e;tiJcle\lS or kernel ot the

thought, and pre8cinds, as muoh a.:po, • .fble, trom
fringe. :Since there must be some pos1tl-te identitication ot toe
object, .ome distinguishing mark, tne.s.ential point of conceptio
1. that ane1::tject so singled out ttahould,be re-1dentltled by

a.

\'lS

that whioh the talk is about, and no tull representation ot 1t

is necessar,. tor this) even when it le,a tul1,. representable
thing. f t 5 8 t
Becaae the concept is 1so1at.d

tro.

the stream ot thought, 1t

l"e1Calns etet'nal11 what it is and oan never change.
second propert7 ot the conoept.

This is the

The mind ma,. change states IU'ld

56Ib1d., 461. In Some Problems ot Phllo.opAl, p. 48, James
sa18 he-use. 811'10nymS tor the words concept and percept. rt'Idea,'
'thought,' and 'intellection' are s1nonJmOus with 'concept.' Instead ot 'percept' I shall otten apeak pt 'sensation,' 'teellng,'
'intuitlon,' and sometimes ot 'sensible exper1ence' or of the '1mmediate tlow' ot consoious llte."
57James, Principles I, 461.
58Ibid., 46.3.

)0

its meanings, at various times, but "the world ot conceptions, or
things intended to be thought about, atands stltt andlmmutabl.,
like Plato's Realm ot Idea •• n $'9
Ho one can den7 that knowledge grows and ohanges, but Jamea
thought that those psyohologists wh.o claim that concepts evelve
trom within were incorrect.

He though.t t;hat concepts did not grow.
,

,'.~

but knowledge groWl with new conoep:f; ••. When a concept is present,
it ma,. su.ggest or instigate a new act ot attention which will reault in a new concept.

Hew oonoepta, however, do not evol•• trom

older oonoepts, the,. "oome trom neW aensations, new movements, new
emotion., new associations, new acts ot attention, and new comparisons ot old conceptions, and not in other

w.,.•• "60

The reason tor

thta unchangeableness ot conoeption is to be tound in the very nature ot concepts.
~arked

Being singled out ot perceptual experienoe and

ott trom their oontext, "they torm an essentially di.con-

tinuous system, end translate the prooess ot our peroeptual experience, whioh 18 naturally a flux, into a .et ot stagnant and
petritied term •• "bl
A third property ot oonception deals with a peculiar element

Dr

thought--the senae ot meaning.

The meaning of a conoeption

does not oonsist in the iaolated meaning of one word, the nucleus

S'9Ibld" 462.

61Ib1d., 467-468.

60Ib1d., 461.
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or kernel.
ception,

It has to do with every word expressing the entire con-

and

each word must be consider,ed with all its fringed re-

latlons. 62 Thus, when the word man1sused in two different sen-

-

,

tence., two entirely ditterent things mar be meant.

ftWhiit:;~
' . wondertul man Jones isJ It,
exclu~e2U:,:;7~;;iovever. when the sentenoe,

tence reters to an individual, as
all otherlndlyldual men are

When the sen-

,

;",'i.:';

Is, "What .. wondert'ul thing Man ist", thare i8 no such exclusion.
The reason t'or this exolusion and 1nolus10n is to be t'ound in the
fringe ot the word

man.

The fringed relations ot this conception,

man. mar apply to all men, to

~

sOlie men, or to one man, dependlng

on

wbat part ot the 1"rlnge is admi tied into the ,ense at meaning of
the word !!n in a partioular context.

This fringe i. an added con-

-

soiousness to the merenuoleus ot the word man.

It "is an abao-

r,tutel,. positiy. sort at teeling, tItanlltorming what would otherwise
~e

mere noise or vislon into something understood; and determining

the seq\lel ot IIY' thinking, the later vdrds and images, in a pertectly defin1te wa1.n63

The presence ot the frlnge is an integral

part of the mind's Object and leads us to universals and to ab~tract

1deas.

James began his di8cusslon ot abstract ideas with a rajec~ion

of Berkeley'. nominalistic position.

~ommon

He olaimed that man'a

mental experience ot abstract ideas argued decisively

62Jam•• , PSlcnoloSl. p. ~o.
63101d.,

241.

at a180 aboye pp. 20-23.

",

against Berkeley.

James allgned himself with the conceptualistic

doctrine ot John Stuart Ml11, though he was not in entire agreemen1
with it.

An abstract idea, according toMl11, does not arise from

the abstraction of one attribute trom others, but from attention
fIx.ed .on one attribute to the exolusion'.t others.
,

,

,','}.

Thus, .there

aPt .

"

no general concepts, properly speald.n~,ibut on17 complex conoept.
:'",
<:!;,~. <;~:

ot objeots in the concrete.

Throughoorieentration of attention,

man is able to oonoeive certain concepts as if theY' were separated
from the rest.

James emphasized thIs latter notion that

"'~hi1e

!a!" ooncentration .2t attention lasts. !!. 11 !!. suffioientl! in...
tt,eBse, !!!. mal !!.!. temporarll1 unoonsoious .9!. anI ~ 1h! other attributes, .!!!S! mal really, ill..!. briet interval, h!.!.! no thins; present

12. .2!!.t

~ ~

If there be

8.

!h!. attributes o<?J1stltuent .2!. !h!.

cOl'lcep~.1

•••

better desoription extant," James added, "ot' a mind

1n pOlses.lon of an 'abstract idea,' than
i8 containodin the word •
. .
.

I have italicized, I am unacquainted wIth. it.,,64
Though James sided with the oonceptualists, he could not go
along with the entire doctrine or Mill.
"that a thought must

~t

He

rejected Mill's notion

what it means. and mean what it is, and

that it it be a picture of an entire individual, it cannot mean anJ
part of him to the exolusion of the rest."65

James's rejection ot

this doctrine is based on his distinction between the total obJeot

64Jame8, Principles I, 470.

-

6SIb1d ., 471.

lJ
ot thought and the topic, or kernel, or

n~oleusj

ot the thought.

The total object oonsists at eaoh word expressing the entire

thought together with its fringed relatione, whereas the topic ot
66
thought is the main subject of the entire disoourse.
When applIed to abstract ideas, Jamests notions of the fringe
and the topic ot thought take on added importance.

James conten-

ded "that the Image Earl' .!!., the nucleus, is functionally the least
important part

of

the thought." 6 7 'rhe important part is the

entire context ot the thought, which includes the fringed relations.

These fringes are tendencies leading us back to the origi-

nal context of the thought in the stream ot consciousness.

There.

tore:
all that a state ot mind need do, in order to take cognizance ot a reality. intend it. or be • about' it, i.
to lead to a remoter state otm,ind which either acts
upon the reality or resembles it. The only class ot
thoughts whioh can with an,. show:. or plausibility be 8aid
to resemble their objects are ••~ations. The sturf et
whioh all Our "other thoughts are 60mposed is symbolio,
and a thought attests its pertinency to a topio b7 simp.
17 terminating, sooner or later, Ina seneatlon vIhicb
resemoles the latter. 68
Thus, when oonoentrated attention singles a oonception out ot
the stream ot consoiousness, this oonception is an abstraot idea,
but it does not haTe to be an exaot duplioate ot what it knows.
It 1s sufficient it that oonception leads the knower to an expel".

67Ibid., 472.

66Ibid.

-

Ct. also above, pp.

68Ibid., 471.
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ienoe that

~ese.bles

the first

expe~ienoe

from whioh it was taken.

So James deoided, with reseryatiOD, in favor ot the oonceptualist's

position on abstraot idea. and attirmed "that the power to think
things, qualities, relations, or whatever other elements there mar
be, isolated and abstraoted from the total experienoe in whioh ther
appear, is the most indisputable funotion of our thought.,,69
An abstraot idea was generally thought to be a universal, but,
tor James, an abstract idea is neither uriivereal nor particular.
Betore it is applied to an ind1v1dual or to a olass ot objeots, it
is nothing but

ft. 'that,' a 'tloating adjeotive.'

•• ". Properlf

it 18, in thi. state, a singular--I haYe .sing1ed it out •• ,,70
When the abstraot oonoept 1s applied to a olass, there is a new
oonoeption--that ot applying.

The new oonception has nothing to do

with any ehange, however, in the topic or nuoleu. of the thought,
but 801elr with the vague

oonsoiou.ne~s

that surrounds the

nuol.~s.

James telt he had disoussed this vague"oonsciousness lutticient17
when he analrzed the fringe and the topio ot thought.

Th.s a uni-

versal ariaes when the mind spreads its attention out trom the nu.
olauB ot the thought to the fringed relations.

It these relationa

are considered as they atfeot an ent1re class, the conception 1.
universal.

It the relation is confined to one individual, the

conception is particular.
69!!!g., 412-413.

-

70Ibid •• 473.

To distingu1sh abstraot and universal

ideas we might use the examples ot a sphere.

The exact center ot

the sphere, prescinded from every other part, is the abstract.
When attention reaches out to the rad!i going trom the center to
the surtace of the sphere, the abstract idea beoomes universal it
all the radi! are considered, or partioular it only one radIus is
a t tended to •.71

In disoussing universals, James rejeoted both nominalism and
oonoeptualism.

He found. it "impossible to tell, in all the whirl

about universal and particular, when the author is talking about
universals 1n the mind, and when about objective universals,
strangely are the two mixed together."72

80

James's reaction to the

whole oontroversy waa that "this is nonsense.

An idea neither 1.

what it knows, nor knows what it is} nor will swarms of oopies ot
the same tldea,t recurring In stereotyped form, or 'by the lrreslatable laws ot assooiation tormed
th1ng

al

a thought ot

'!!l!h!

Into~one

idea,' ever be the same
-,

Eo.s~ble member,' of a 01&88."13

James looked tor an explanation of the universal 1n hi. ana17sla ot consciousness.

He found h1s explanation in the fringe, as

we expla1ned on the preoeding page.

James admitted, however, that,

If the •• "swarms," postulated br the nominalists, could be translated into oerebral terms and thus made to stand for something

-

71Ibld.
72rbid,.

475.
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real, this opinion would be less hollow than the conceptualist
opinion.

He thought this translation could take place "if each

'idea' stands top some special nasoent nerve-ppocess, then the aggregate ot these nascent processes might have for its consoious
oorrelate a psychic 'fringe,' whioh should be just that universal
meaning, or intention that the name or mental pioture employed
should mean all the possible individuals of the 01&88."74
James felt, however, that the whole oontroversy was an insignificant detail in the taoe ot the tact that the mind works with
universals, no matter what they may be.

He oonoluded that "our

meanings are ot singulars, partioulars, IndetlnltesJ and universal.
mixed together in every way.

A

sin~ular

individual i. as much

conceived when he is isolated and identified away trom the rest ot
the world in my mind, a. is the most rarefied and universally applioable quality he may possess--beine. tor example, when treated
in the same vaT- tt7S

The only value of "universals, thereto;., 1s

that they help us to know new truths about individual things, and
"the traditional universal-worship can only be called a bit ot
pervers. sentl11entalism, a philosoph.ic 'ld.ol ot the cave.' "76
Once he had resolved for himself the problema ot abstract and
universal ideas, James turned to a discussion ot the purpose ot

--..

74Ihid.
1SIbid. t 479.

761bid., 480.
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conception.

He began by restating the second oharacteristio anal-

yzed from consciousness: "nothing
~ being conceived

is

~ ~

conceived

tw1c~ ~ ~

entirelI different states ~ ~."77

Jame.

held that the essence of conception is that a second thought i. reidentified as the same as a previous thought in the stream of consciousness.

When an object i8 oonceived twice or more times, how-

ever, the notion of "twioe," or "more times," is an added note.

"As a matter ot taot, the thoughts by which we know that we mean
the same thing are apt to be very ditterent indeed trom each other,
We think the thing now in one context, now in another; now in a
definite image, now in a symbol.

Sometimes our sense

or

its iden-

tity pertains to the mere fringe, sometimes it involves the nucleul~
ot our thought. n78 Thus, beeause the mind 1s constantly in difterent states--growing and evolving with knowledge it constantly
reeeiyes,--eaeh new conception ot the:. same object 113 a little difterent than the previous oonception.
In this notion ot the evaluation of thought,
seemingly contradictory elements.

He

J~~es

has two

speaks of conception as de-

pending on sameness, yet he states that two conceptions can never
be the same.

He resolves this problem by distinguishing the es-

a.noe and the purpose ot conception.
Though the essence of conception oonsists in the continuity

77ill!!.
78Ibid.

-

)8
and permanency ot the topic ot a thought, the purpose ot conceptloD
oomes trom the mlnd's operatlng on the thought.

The mind alters,

ImproYes, and substltutes one pred1cate tor another without eyer
lettlng the subject change.

"This," James remarks, "is wbat 1s

lIIeant when it is sald that thinklng consists In making j\1dgmenta."7~
In makina judgments all sorts ot new reaulta are brought out.

The

entire process might be reduced to mereI1 haYing the topic, then
operating on it through judgment., and tinal11 haying It again in
a richer and truer wa1-

~U8,

In the end "a compound conception

bas been substituted tor the Simple one, but wlth full oonsciousness that both are ot the 5 . .e."80
This enrichment ot the conoept comes trom the fact that consciousness and the mind are alva18 changing and .Yolving.

When

the mind operates on the data given to sense, It transtorms the
order In which experlence comes into
that of the conc.ived world.

~

entlrely dltter.nt order,

Jame. contrasted the conceptual or-

der to a ale.e in,whioh a man trIes to gather up tbe world"
tents, how....ert
Moat tacts and relations tall through its meshes, being
ei ther too subtle or insignificant to b e tlxed in &D1
conception. But whenever a phYSical reality 1s caught
and identitled as the same with something already ooneel ...ed, it remains on the slev., and all the predicate.
and relations ot the oonoeption with whioh it is identitied beoome its predicates and relations toO) it is
subjected to the sieve'. n.tnrorlt , in other words.

79!!!!., 481.

-

801D1d •

con-
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Thus oomes to pass what Hr. Hodgson oalls the translation of the perceptual into the oonoeptual order ot
the world. 51
This notion ot transformation led James to consider the ultimate purpose of conception.
teleological instrument.
fixing, !nS boldin, taat
~

!h! !!2!

~

Conception "is really nothing but a

Ie!!
~

whole tunction !! conceiyins,

meanina.,

S!! S!

~

.1sn1ticange tRart

!!! conceiver !! ~ oreature

~ ~art1al

pur-

. poses ~ private end,.ft82
fhi. teleological notion ot Jamel aanbe found in hi. earliest
writings.

In an article, publi.h.d 1n 1879. be .&71 that the

quest in philoaopbJ 1s a .earoh tor a conoeption.
bed a. fta teleolGsieal instrument.

Thi. he desori-

It is a partial aspeot ot a

thing which tor £St purpo.e we regard as ita .s ••ntial aspeot, a.
the representative ot the entire thing. • • • the ••••nc., the
ground ot oonc.ption. varies with the" end we have in view. ft8J
Jamea adopt.d thia teleologIcal aapeot, this dependence of oonceptlon on the will of the knower, because "no ooncept can be a valid aubatitate for a concrete reallt7 except with reterence to a
partioular intereat in the conoeiver.

••• The only virtue • • •

oonoeption need have is simplicity, and a 8imple conception i. an
equival.nt tor the world on17 so tar a. the world is aimple, the
81Ibld., 482.
82Ibid
.........•
8JWI11Iam Jame., "The SentIment ot Rationalit7." Colleoted
E,aals ~ ReYiew., edt Ralph Barton Perry (New York, t9~o), p. 86.

world meanwhile, whatever simplicity it may harbour, being a180 a
mightily complex attalr. ft8 4
James developed the idea ot conception as teleological when
be discusled it as a part ot the reasoning process.

Reasoning, top

Jame., wal the substitution ot abstraot properties tor a concrete
obSect.

Conception gives us these properties} thereby it beoomel

part ot the process.
In conception on11 one out ot many possible properties of an
objeot i8 singled out and attended to.

Since the object has

ma~

properties, anyone of these could be conceived; but whichever
property is singled out i8 just as true as
glected.

anr

that baa been ne-

James concluded, therefore, that "all ways of conceiving

a concrete tact, it they are true ways at all, are equallJ true

ways.

There

11 E2 eroperty ABSOLUTELY essential

~ anI ~ thing.ft)5

Therefore, there is no injustice in attributing only one property
•

to an object to the exclusion ot others.

Moreover, there il an

excuse tor thia mode ot conceiving: "My excuse i8 necessity-.the
neoessity whioh my tinite and praotica1 nature 1a71 on me.

My

thinking 18 tirst and laat and always tor the lake of my doing,
and loan do only one thing at a tIme. fte6

James admitted that this notIon ot practIcality was aga1nst

84Ib1d •• 123.
851b1d,
86James , Principles. II, 333.

the common-sense and acholastic notions, which contend that tbere
ls one thing absolutel,. proper to an object--its essence.
~~

James Insisted that
~ ~

clas.itication

But

onil meanins g! essence !! teleolosical,

~

conception

~

purell teleological

!!! elsence ot a thing is that one ot its
properties which is eo important !2t ~ Interests that in compari-

weapons

~ !S!~.

son with It I

ma,.

neglect the rest. n87

In an article,

~Retles

Action and Theism," written in 1881,

James discussed what he meant

tor private ends.

b,. conception being an Instrument

Hind 1s committed to be a teleological mechan-

ism, he thought, because ot the retlex theory ot action.

This

theorr means:
that the acts we pertorm are alwa7sthe result ot outward discharges trom the nervous centres, and that these
outward discharges are themselTes the result ot impressions trom the external world, carried in along one or
another ot our sensor,. nerves •• ~ •• The structural unit
ot the nervous srstem is in tact· a triad, neither ot "
whose elements has any independent existence. The 8ensorr impression exist. onl,. tor the sake ot awaking the
central process ot reflection, and the central prooess
ot retlection exists only tor the sake ot calling torth
the tinal act. All action is thus re-action upon the
outer world) and the mid.le stage or-consideration or
contemplation or thinking i8 only a place ot transit,
the bottom ot the loop, both ot whose engft haTe their
polnt ot application in the outer world.

Thus, the thInking tacult7 "tunctious exclusivell
~nds

~

!a! A!!! 2!

that do not exist at all 1n the world ot impressions • , •

335.
88WI11iam James.
87Ibid.,

"Retlex Action and ThelsM," Essals on Paith
~ Morals, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New York, 1947'. pp. II3-f14.
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but are aet by our emotional and practical subjectivity altogether. n89

The thinking t"acult7 t:ranstol'ms the data received .trom

the seDSe world into a conceiTed order, and the transformation i.
affected by the interests ot mants volitional nature.
James waa torced to call on manta volitional nature to direct
the transformation of' the perceived world into the conceived world,
because he thought that man had "no organ or facult,. to appreciate
the simply given order."90 Since man cannot appreciate the g1ven
order, he must break its complexity and multiplicity into parts
and remodel it in his mind.

That this 1s the proper way ot handling

the given order is "the miracle ot m:1racles, a miracle not yet
exhaustive11 cleared up by any philosophy,

~

~

• tbat the given

order lends itselt to remodeling."91
There was, Jame. thought, an
beyond the reach ot man"

mind.

~lement

in all things that was

Sine, man has to deal with all

things, there must be some way, besides the time, .to remodel the
given order.
modeling.

Another faculty must be called in to direct the re-

This faculty is the will.

JameS considered this the

higher taculty, and through its response to the nature ot things
man has the best communication he oan bave with the world.

There-

tore, man's cognitive taculty is subordinated to his volitional
89~•• 115.

-

90Ib1d., 118.

-

91Ibld., 119.

taoult,._

James summarized his ideas with the thought that "in

ever7 being that is real there is something external to, and sacred
t~om,

the grasp ot everr other.

God's being is saored trom ours,

To co-operate with his creation by thee b$st and rightest response
seems all he wants ot us.

In such co-operation with his purpose •

• • • must lie the real meaning otourtie'stin,..n92
In this chapter we have discussedJ..:mests psychological notion ot concept.

To see the concept in proper perspective, it was

necessary to dlscuss the stream otconsciouaness trom whiQh the
concept arises and ot whose elements the concept partakes.

Throu~

a discusslon ot the charaoteristics, properties, and teleological
valu. and purpose ot the concept, we have arrived at the tull.
blown notion ot concept whioh James had eT01Ted when he tinished
the Prinoiples in 1890.

There were problems, however, which had

sprung up dl.tt'ing the wri tins ot the

!X~~Cip1e8

and which James put

aside until he could think them tbrougi'more thoro.ghly.

Now we

must consider the philosoph,. he d.eTlsed as an explanation ot and
solution to the.e problems.
92Ibid., 141.

CHAPTER III
RADICAL EMPIRICISM: A SOLU¥Id.J~~ SOME PROBLEMS
,:~:;:,t!~, ",' ," . ::/ ;:;'~~;;}~;f

When James tinished the princ!~l~iI':~,lhe felt he had presented
the tacts and data ot mental lite ~~d';i~;jlYit1'.
"

Howeyer, the

~;}, _1" ;: :': ";," :)~:.( '~~": ~'~~:

'

lem of how knowledge was possible 'p!;;j;~,still concerned him.
~if\:.,

He

.;!:.. "~ . ",\'

knew tromhisstudies and experlmei~.:ji.t men know, but he did
not know how two

and known, could

be joined 1n the
A

.econd problem James considj'~~:,""8 concerned wi th

ceptual and :O'nCeptual wO'r1ds.

A1j~fl~>~~d

ot the last chapter we

saw that he held that the tunctionot the cognitive faou1ty is to'
remodel the world presented to it by the' aenaea.
was, primarll7, the task ot

transfor.l~
~

This function

the perceptual world intO'

the conceptual, under the guidanoe O't the volitional tacu1ty, in
crder to' giye man a plan of action in the world.
to conoeption both a meaning and a content.

James attributed

The meaning, having

to do with the fringe of the object, went belond the content.

Her

was the problem: How CQuld a oonception terminate in an ettect

lWilliam Jamea,PslchQloR, ed. Ralph Barton Perr7 (CleTeland,
1948), p. 462.
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4$
that waa gre.ter than Its cause?2
James. also, sought a means ot reconolllng the contradlctory
oharacterlstics he analysed in the concept and In the atream trom
which It arose,

These contradictory elements were dlscretene.s

and oontlnuit7, unchangeableness and changeableness, the selt-sutticiency ot sensation and the inadequacy ot concwption,
James recognized these problems as belonging to metaphyslca.
Psychology had taken him as tar as it could.

He considered it to

be "particularly tragile, and Into whlch the waters ot metaphysi.
cal criticism leak. at every jolnt, a psychology allot whoae elementary assumptions and data must be reoonsidered In wider connections and tranalated into other terms,_3

After writing the

!t!!-

ciplea he telt tree to take up the proylsional philosophlcal doctrine he had held In reserve tor man, years.
James Itated the nature and purp9se that he thought a phlloaophJ .hould have in an address, "The Se4tlmeut ot RationalIty,"
given in 1819.
Man'. rational nature, he contended, seeks rest
,
and peace in an harmonious unity ot the diverse elements ot the
world.

The philosophic need, theretor., 18 to bring the sensible

diveraity ot the world into a unlty, while, at the aame time, preserving the clearness ot the diverse elements considered separatel,
This will be accomplIshed when man reaches a unity in diveraity.

2:rbld., 465.
3Ibld., 467.
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when the parts tit together into an intrinsic achematio whole.
"The entire process ot philosophic simplification ot the chaos conslsts ot two acts, Identification and Association.

Both are prln-

aiples ot union and theoretic rationality; but the rationality between things associated 1s outward and oustom-bred.

On1~

when

things are identified do we pass inwardly and necessarily trom one
to the other. "4
James proposed two steps toward unitying the chaos.
step is to classlty the items ot the chaos.

The tirst

This is done by con-

centration ot a concept10n on a particular attribute ot a thing.
When a certain attribute is picked out in this way, "we literally
and

strictly identity it

1a ~

respect with the other concretes

ot the class having that attribute tor its essence."5
Tbe second step in the unitication of the chaos 1s the associ.

atioD ot class attributes among themselves.

This is achieved when

the oonnection betwe.n certain class-concepts and certain determined consequences is established. 6 The co~~eotions between things
only becomes establisbed, bowaTer, "when, by suoceasive substitutions of essencea tor thIngs, and

highe~

for lower essenoes, we

sucoeed in reaching a point ot view trom whioh we can vIew tbe

_

4William Jame., "The Sentiment ot Rationality," Collected Ea.
says and .............................
Reyi.wa, ed. Ralph Barton Perry (New York, 1~~11), p. lOT.
'

"Ibid., 102.
"Ibid., 105.
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things as one."7
Thus, tl'om this statement of' the purpose ot philosophy, Jam••
thought it eyident that "our idea of the univel'sa cannot assume an
inwardly l'ational shape until each separate phenomenon 1s conoeiye.

as tundamentally identioal with eyer,. other. He

1

This was his vay

ot stating his seapch tor an intrinsI0 unitying element 1n things.

He did not uant an external tramework, nol' even a 10g1cal one it
it were not Intl'insic to things themselves.
Among the elements to be bl'ought into unity were those ot the

perceptual and conceptual worlds.

Betore we will be able, howeyer,

to show how lames claimed to unity these almost contl'adictory
worlds, we must discuss, at some length, th8 unifying prinoiple
that he derived f'or all things, acoording to his philsophioal

id.a.~

For eight 7e&1'S atter the Principles had been published Jame.
worked OYel' his tentative philosophioal system.

James called hi.

general attitude in philosophy that ot "radical empiricism, and the
basic, unifying element to be tound in all things he called ·pure
experience."

In 1898, while ;ecomlng

mo~e

conYinoed that his phil-

osophy ot pure expel'ience might be the lolQtton he was seeking,
James wrote that "the whole B!! ot the tchange ot basel ,to pure experience is to see whetber one may thereby solve certain problems
whioh are stickers on the usual dualistio categories, e.g.: • • •
7Ib1d., 108.

-

8Ib1d., 109.
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(5) The peroeptual and conceptual world ••.••• Could the taots
that enter lnto these problems be smooth.ty tormulated without para. dox or con;radiction on the basis of tlle":;pure experience or purephenomenon hypothasls, then the latterllduld certainly 8core a
great triumph. n9
While James was

ot the

ass~tions

hls philosophy, he rejected man1

~orumlat1ng

he had made in writing hi. Princ1Eles.

Among

the questioned assumpt10ns was that of the primacy he had attributed to oonsciousness.

At the end of bis PSloholoSl, he wrote that

"it seems as if consciousness
Rostula~e

an inner act1v1ty were rather a

8S

than a sensibly given fact." 10 In 1904, therefore, 1n

an article entitled "Does Oonsciousness Exist?" James made a tormal
statement of his new position that there is onl,. "one primal stuff
or material in the world, a stuff ot whioh everything is composed,
and it we oall that stutf 'pure
si11 be explained." 11

exper~enee.t
"

then knowing oan ea-

.

In this study of the broad outlines ot James's philosophy

or

pure experienoe, the three diYisions established by Ralph Barton
Perry will b e rolloved.

The first stage or James t s development,

9Ralph Barton Perry. The Thosght and Oharacter ot William
James (Boston, 193$), II, ~-j69. '0;-& comple!e pICture of
Jamea's p~oblems in formulating pure experience, ott William James,
~ Pluralistic Universe, edt Ralpb Barton Perr7 (New York, 1943),

pp.

~65-!1j.

10Jame., P8ICbololJ, p. ~7.
llWilliam James, Eseals in Radioal Empiricism, edt Ralph Barton Perl',. (New York, 1943', p:-4.

49
according to

P.rr~,

is the psychological stage.

sists in the enrichment

This phase con-

the conception ot experience in order

o~

that it may be competent to embrace the structures and activities
of knowledge.

ThE! second phase is to bring withln experience the

distinction between mind and body.

This demands that experience

be "neutralized," treed from exclusive association with conscious-

ness so that it may embrace the physical world as well.

The third

and last step in Jamests development is to identify this new con.
12
ception ot experience with the metaphysical reality.
Each ot

these three phases will be discussed in turn in order that the salient features ot James's philosophy may be seen.
James's initial formulation of his philosophy consisted in
the enrichment ot experience.

This enrichment took place in his

analysis ot consciousness whioh was discussed in the previous chapter.

However, there are three philosophically significant ideas

that should be stressed.
The tirst of these ideas is that

consciousness.

Despite the

o~sourit1

ot the tranal t1.ve states ot
of these states, James

de~

clared that they were actually present to the sensitive and practised eye of an introspectionist.
quality their
to_be. n13

~ermini--both

the has-just-been and the soon·about-

The philosophical importance ot these states is that

l2aalph Bar~on Perry,
Haven, 1938), pp. 76-77.

-

There importance is that "they

lJlbid., 82.
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they give "veritiable meaning to concepts which had hitherto b.en
abstract and verbal."14
Perry considers Jamests Insistence on the validlty ot the
transitive states an example ot James's ettorts "to carryall the
terms ot discourse back to the orlglnal data ot sense."lS Jamea,
In thi. ettort, thought the term "teelingft would best express what
be deslred, It it was treed trom its as.ociatlon wlth attective or
emotional stat...

Thls teeling would be, James thought, "the

appre~

henslon ot the in-it.eltne.s ot so.e root character, di.cr1mlaabl.
trom all others, requiring a name ot its own, and .voking the co..
ment, II see what it i8,' trom minda pos.es.ed ot the appropriate
sensibilitie. and dIrected to the rlght context. w16
James t , second important idea in this psychological atage ot
the development ot his philosophr is that he gave e.pirical meaning to the relation ot subject and ob4ect.

Phi1osopber. ot James'.
"

time thought that there was no common ground ot whlch both subject
and object partook.

James reduced the subject to veritiable ter••

Dr cODsidering per.onal identIt, a. "the experience that 'make. a

man be ai•• elt to himselt.,n 17 With the subject put back into experience along wlth the object, the relatlonship between them no

141bid •

_.

lSIbld

161b1cl., 83.

-

171bi4., 86.
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longer bad to be assumed or postulated.
common experience.

It could be tound in a

James telt that it abstracted elements, sucb

as subject, were restored to their original experience, be would
tind these elements embedded in a matrix of original relationships.
Then there would be no need ot postulating some artifioial trame.
work to explain these re1ationshiPs.18
The third important teature or Jame.'s psychological sta,e is
his reduction ot idea and objeot to the common terms ot experience.
When the idea is of the perceptual world, it becomes oontluent witb
experience.

In ide.. ot the conoeptual world Jame. distinguished

two objectivitie., one internal and one external.

"fhe internal

object is the experienoe ot reterence itselt • • • • fhis objectivity gccurs, 1n the now-pre.ent experlence. n19 Besides thls pre'ent meaningfulne.s ot the concept, which consists in tendencie.
ot the tringe, there is a180 an external element, the "meant."
Thi. ". .ant" is the tuture experience .oward which the pre.ent oon-

cept i8 pointing and whioh will glve validity to the present ooncept when it is actuall, experienced.

Perr, sa1s that these "ul-

terior .bjectlve .eaning which remain transcendent, becoae a set
ot experiences differing not in any radical sense, but onlJ in
their accidental inacoessibility_

As distant, bJpothetloal, or

poasible experience •• the, are ot the aame nature, and lie in the
18 Ibid ., 89.
19Ib1d.,,90_

$2

same tield, as the present experience_ ft20

Th~s, through a retined

ana17sis, James has reduoed ideas to the verT same field of experience as objects occuP7_
James cla1med that the

~ee

ideas just discueased were only

supplementations ot the data accessible through introspection.

Wlt~

the caretul introspection James u.ed he enriched the content ot
consoiousness.

The three ideas just discussed were also the im-

portant one., philosophica11l, in that

e~lchment.

and ther mark

the PSlchologieal stage ot his development.

The second phase ot Jamests development os hi. philosophy ot
experience Perry calls the "phenomenalistic phase. ft

This phase

~eduction

ot the bodilr and mental
worlds to the same or1ginal components. u21 To aobieve this reduois primaril7 "an analrais, a

tion, James had to neutrali.e experienoe, to tree it trom its association with consoiousness.

The di,ous8ion ot this seoond pha••

will consiat ot tour points: (I) pure experience as a method, (2)
a retine.ent ot the notion of oODsoiousness, ()

the

neutrallzatio~

of experience, (4) Perry's analysis of this phase.
Even atter Jamel reduced subject and idea to the field of experience, as was discussed aboYe, he st1ll assumed an ulterior
physical reality whioh consciousness did not include.

In his et-

tort to reconstruot the basic structures ot this reality and oon-

..........

20Ibid., 91* .

21fb1d ., 97~

;3
sciousness so that the,. could be tounded in a more basic unitying
reality. James assumed pure experience as a method.

"~he

princi-

ple ot pure experienoe," he writes, "is a180 a methodical postulate. • • • Everyth1ns real must be experienceable somewhere, and
eyerT kind ot thing experienced must somewhere be r8al."22
pretace to his collection ot essays under the title ot

In the

I!! XeaniDl

2£ Truth, James restates this principle and elaborates on it. He
speaks here ot radical empiricism which is the general theory that
protesses pure experienoe to be the basic reality.

JAm.s then

loes on to sar that
radioal empiricI •• consists tirst of a postulate, next
a statement ot tact, and tinally a generalized oonclusion.
The po.tulat. is that the onl,. things that shall
be debatable among philosophers ahall be things detin~
able In.term. drawn trom experience • • • •
The statement ot tact 1s that the relations b ....
tween things, conJunct1ve as well as disjunctive, are
Just as auoh matter. or dtreot p~rtiou1ar experienoe,
neither more so nor leiS 80. than ~he things themselves.
Tb.e generalized oonolusion i.,that thel'Qtore the
parts of experience hold togetber trom next to next
b1 relations that are themselves parts ot experience. 23
Arter James adopted pure experienoe as a methodioal postulate,
he subjeoted oonsoiousness it•• lt to this empirical oriterior.
Finding that "the ditterenoe between mind and body it.elt 1. an
experienced ditterence, then it il clear that experienoe must be

22Jame., Radioal Empiric! •• , p. 160.
(New

23William Jame., The Meanina ot Truth, ed. Ralph Barton Perr1
York, 194.3). p.

xrr:

-
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assigned a me:re exteneled mea.ning than oon8010118ne88_"24 Thepetore,
James adopted the word "pure 8%pv1ence,"
cont~sed

80

that it would not be

with the experience of oonsciousness.

Up to this time he

bad Qsed the word consciousness and experience interchangeablr_
Now exper1ence was "a more inclus1ve manifold within wh1ch consoiousness itselt • • • wa.s

distinguished and explained_"Z5

This new meaning and limitation Qf consciousness enabled
James to give explicit empirical interpretation to the dualitr be.
tween the knowing mind and the external world.

In the knower-

known relatIonship, the object has a cognitive objeot:vit1 within
oonsciousness.

It has also a. metaphrsical objactlvlt~, indepen~

dent ot its part in the knowledge relationship, "in the sense of

belonging to another order than that mentalit7 into which, through
being known, it is Introduoed. R26

Thus in knowledge the mind some-

how reaches beyond Itselt to anothep order.
Once Jam.s bas, therefore, made experience more inclusive
than consoiousness, he oan aooount tor this new obJeotivity "by
oonoe1ving that the phJs1cal order and the mental order overla.p
1n common phenomena or pure experlenoe. ft27
Perry's analysis ot this second phase ot James's philosophy
24Perry, In the Spirit ot William Jam••• p. 93.

2SIbid •
26Ibid .,

21Ibid.

-

9S.

1s that it is tentative and not clearly

to~.ulated.

He olal•• that

the main prinoiple, however, "ls clear, name17. that both subjeotivity in the mental sense and obJeotlvit7 In the phys10al sense
are pat"t1cular modes of experience in the "pure" or "phenomenal"
sense. n28

In this phase pllre experience has not been raised to the

ultimate reality, it 1s a mere potentiality or a class name
the ultImate reality.

tor

It must first be filled out and elaborated

before it can become the

cov~on

element of all things.

Perry con-

oludes that James, in this second phase. "introduoed pure experience as the abor1g1nal form ot being, embracIng consciousness, together with non-conscious or non-mental forms of being, suoh as
bodles.,,29
With experience so neutralized, at the end of this phenomenalistic .. tage of his philosQphi.cal development, that 1 t is the abor-

iginal

to~ro

or

all things,

J~~ea

is

and tinal phase, the metaphysical.

r~ady

to prooeed to his third

In''this phase, James raises

pure experienee to the ultimate metaphysioa1 real1ty_

The discus-

sion ot this third phase will oonsiet of three steps: (1) the ideatifioation of pure experience with the ultimate reality, (2) the
tive oharaoteristios ot pure experience in this phas., (3) Perry'.
analysis of Jamea'smetaphyslcs ot experience.
In the first and second phases ot his phIlosophical develop-

28Ibld., 91.
29IbId"

100.

~.nt,

James wideDed the notion ot experience b1 reduoing various

~ealities

to empirical11 veritiab1e terms.

James had made it pos-

sible that mind and bod7, and all their modes ot exi.tence, Were
experienceable realities.
~ealities,

'l'o

tind the deeper teatures ot the.e

be turned to his analysis ot perceptual experience.

"Th,

deeper teatUres ot reality," he writes, "are tound onl,. in perceptual experienoe."30
When James ana17zed perceptual experienoe, it was not the obvious teatures he looked tor but the hidden meanlngs.

Perr,. give.

an example or this ana1,-sis ot,Jeeats thoughts on 11te.
wrltes that "there is someth!.ng in lite,

'8 one tee19

Jam••

its pre.ence,

that seems to dety all the possible resourees or phraseology. • •
Tbe living moments--8ome liylng moments, at an,. rate--nave aomewhat ot absolute flt0meth.ing ot the abaolut! that needs no lateral
support.

Their meaning seeMS to

vell~up

trom out ot their .ery

centre, in a way impossible yerbally todescrib •• "31
siders these moments

8.S

Perry con-

the moments ot integration when experlenoe

becomes a selt-sustaining reallt,..32
James himself writes ot his reality

a8

coming in moment. or

30william James, Some Problema of PhiloloPBl (New York, 1940).
p.97.
--

31Orlg1na1 paragraph whlch Jam.. wrote tor the opening ot the
Gittord leotures .uDI.q.ent1~ published under the title, The VarI-

eties of R_litiOUI E!§erience, quoted bl Perr~, fhe fho~a~
Character of 1111am ames (Boston, 193$), II, 3~ ,~ iii 1n
Sracket. would s.em to Se the author's meaning.

32Per~, ~!e! Spirit g! William Jam•• , p. 103.

$7
parts.

He ears that "though one part of our experlenctlt may lean

upon another part to make it what it is in anyone ot several aspects in which it m8J be considered, experience as a whole is selt.
containing and leans on nothing_ttl)

Thus, James identified pure

experience with the ultimate metaphyaieal reality.
Onoe he

hRS

shown how James

id~ntlfied

pure experience with

basie reality, Perry begins to enumerate the characteristics which
the deeper features ot pure experience will hnve.
Belng Identified with experience, this realIty wf.ll have all
the qualities of 8ensation--lmmediaey, diversity, vividness, and
vltallt,. • .34
The gradual untolding of the world through
ond characteristic of

th~s

pure

exper1enc~.

th~ught

1s a seo-

Since thought is a

seleotion dictated by somA personal interest, it is evident that
the!'e is something greater than the selection.

"To select is to

~&s1duum

excluded trom the

select trom, which implies not only a

seleotion, but a togetherness ot the included and exoluded in the
original Plenum*"l5 Since the plenum must be so constituted that
the seleotion ls possible, it must be a f1eld of eligibility, and
therefore, a world suitable to the exeroise ot treedom. 36

33 James , Radioal Emei!'ioism, p. 193. Fo!' a complete view ot
this IdentltlcatIon, cf. !ome Problems ot PhI1osophl, Chat X, XI
and ~lurall.tlc Ul\i...,,;r,ut, -miS. VI, Vlf.34Perry,

!n!h!.

35Ibld., 104.
'\6_
.......... 'iIa ..

S21rit

s.r. William

James, p. 10,3.
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The third characterist1c or experienoe is the effort to reconst1tute the undivided rield ot choice.

By being aware ot the

interests that prompted the selection from the

~len~~

in the Seo-

ond stage, the metaphysician can reconstruct this original plenum.
Each act ot selection is an enriohment of

ot experience, but atter analysis the

~ind

t~e

conorete immediacy

is able to apprehend

a greater Tolume of the original experience.

"~he

aim ot

~eta

physics 1s to profit by seleetiye attention so that the ditferentiated features may be embodied in a more adequate and inolusive

synthe~ls."37
A fourth characteristic, olosely related to the third, 1s the
originality ot reality_

From an analysis

aware of the oriGinal plenum.
"e. selection

lected. n38

i~1

or

selection we become

Thus analYZed, James t s llorld 1s

the making, amidst a superabundance ot the unse-

This world of James exoluqes nothing and includes

thing experienceable.

ev.r,~

Perry writes that ffhis universe is a uni-

Terse by Tlrtue of its omitting nothing, bj virtue of its indeterminate immenSity and oomplexity. its unanalyzed ingredients, its
unplumbed depths, its passage beyond every horizon, and not by
T1rtue ot any architeoture, or structural delimitat1on, whether
logical, aesthetio, or moral."39

-

37Ibid., 105-106.

-

38 Ib1d ., 108.

39Ibid., 101.

Continuity is the fitth and tinal characterlstia of James's
world ot pure experienoe.

James saw the problem of continuity as

a phase of the problem of the one and the many.

In some way the

unity ot continu1t7 had to be reoonoiled with the plurality ot dis.
creteness.

In other words, how can the discrete moments of exper-

ienoe be reoonciled with the general tlow ot the stream ot experience?

James proposed to solve this probleM "by the notion ot a

manitold or overlapping partioulars.
this

~eans

In its tCr1?oral applioation

that STory moment is both retrospeotive L,d prospeotiTe

as well as presant. n40

Eaoh moment, theref.ore, oontains, in some

way, the elements 0:' t::·very other mO'Jlent 1n the stream ot experienct Ito

Eaoh moment

or

this

ex~erienoa

contains both what it has inherited

trom the past and what it needs to push onward toward the tuture.
!he p:roblem ot the perceptual and conceptual worlds 1s a particular application ot this problem ot continuity, since the parceptual world 18 contInuous and the conceptual is disorete.

Parr,.

says that a theory ot knoi>V'ledge can dtstlr.guish between tho concept as an instrument and the reality to 'Hh1ch 1 t applies..

"Meta.

phy'sics, on tho other hand;, -:rJust bring them into the same world.
The comparatIve unroality of ooncepts must somehow be reconciled

... -

with the tact that ........
there
are ooncepts."41 Ja=es'a problem was
;;;;,;;;,..
that ot giving validity to oonception after he said that percep-

40 Ib1d., lOq.
411b14., 110.

-
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tua1 knowledge reveals experienee.

He inoreased th3 difficulty ot

his problem by admitting that concepts have a certain objectivity

ot their own.
Jamests solution to this problem is a suggestion rather than

an elaborated explanation, says Perry.

"The essence of it 11es in

regarding conoepts as abstractions, outs, excerpts, taken from the
plenum ot reality by an interested act of seleotion.

They present

renlity in some partial aspect suitable to action • • • or serve
as a substitute tor th3 fullor experience when it is unattalnable. ft42

When attentive selection foouses on a partial aspeot ot

n reality, there is a conoept.

It is only separated in the sense

that it Is d1stingulsed tram its context, but its oontext 1s none
the less there.

It is not separated in

concepts are real tor they are part ot

Cm
t~e

ontological sense.

Thus

stream of exper1ence,

!'but they are unreal lmen taken by themselves as partial views ot
realitj.4.3
James

r~artirmed

ting fixed meanings.

the 'ValIdity of conco;>tlo:::1, also, In admit-

When a part of experience is selected tronl

the stream, it is divested ot its changeable oharacteristics and
it is seon an :f"lxed and eternal.

The tl"ue reality ot this part

or

experience, however, is round only in the continuity ot the .tream.~

42Ibid., 110-111.

4J 1b1d .. ,
44Ibid.,

-

-

111.
112.
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'erry summarizes Jame.'. philosophy when he write. that "1n
its tinite and synthet1c concreteneaa, it e.cape. the paradoxes
which beset ab.tract infinity.

Its overlapping and interpenetra-

tion ot parts illuminate the mystery

o~

identity and ditterence.

Thus, the world or appearance not only loses those characters ot
inadequaoy which have incited rationalistic metaphysics to its
dialectioal quest, but pro.es it.elt to be a potent solYent ot ancient problems."45
The main line. ot James's philosophioal deYelopment, througb
the three phases outlined by Perry, bave been the .ubject ot our
discussion thus tar in tbi. chapter.

Now, it is nece.sary to turn

to anotber development, akin to that ot philosophy, whioh had importance in Jame.'s notion ot concept.
pragmatism.

This is his development ot

We will attempt to .how the importance and relation

ot pragmatism to radical empiricism bl examining the roots ot
these two developments.

Then, there will be a briet statement ot

James'a theory ot meaning and ot truth.
Jamea's pragmatism and radical empirici •• developed together
both in hi. mature thought and in his writing•• 46 The relationship between tbe.e two streams ot development were important tor
James considered that "the establishment ot the pragmatist theory
45Perry, !hought ~ Character, I, 461.

46A study or the Annotated Bibliosra bl ot the Writinss ot
William Jam•• by Perry, shovs that tbe ma n bOdy-ot ~amest. phIlosophlcal wrIting took place in 1904-1906, vhereas his pragmatism
vas elaborated on trom 1901-1908.

1
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ot truth 1s a step ot f1rst-rate 1mportanoe in making radical e.pirieia. prevail. M47

Through the application ot pragmatism to the

problems ot the conceptual world James hoped to reduce conception
to the world ot experience by explaining the meanlng and truth ot
concepts in experiential terms.

Perry suggests two connectlons be-

tween Jame.'s philosophy and his pragmatism:
First. the torme. is an applioation ot the latter: the
pragmatio method and standard ot truth are repeatedly
applied to the proot ot pluralism and the dlsproot ot
monis.. Second, the latter is applied to the tormer:
that ls, the pragmatio aocount ot knowledge aftords a
special case ot the plural1stio .etaphysics_ • _ •
Pragmatis. does not merely provide a method whicb can
be employed 1n .etaphys1cs--it provides a metaphysics
ot truthwb1cb is consistent with that general metaphysics which James advocate., through bringing the
entire procgss ot cognition within the tield ot possible
experienoe.
,.

A brier glance at the origins ot pragmatism wl1l tind traces

ot it in Jamests earliest writings.

James himselt traced his

earliest tormulations ot pragmatism to., an address given in',188S,
"On the Function ot Cognit10n."49 He tormally declared his pragmatism 1n an address given in 1898, "Philosophical Conceptions and
Pract1cal Results."

Perry traces James.s pragmat1sm to articles

written in the 1870's where James .tressed the teleological aspeat
ot knowledge.

In an article entitled,

47James, !eanig

.2! 'fruth,

"Th.

De.elopment or Jam.s's

p_ xii.

48perrJ, Tboulb~ and Character, II,

490t • Mean1~ ot Tru.th, pp. 41-42. Here J"es lists the 1deas

explicit 1ft

hI.

~dre.s

whIch w.re later developed in his PralUll&t1s;11.

r
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Pragmatism Prior to 1879," Maurice Baum claimed that it his evidence and conclusions are sound, "James was a pragmatist betore he
wrote his '.lcho1081, and he had attained prior to 1879 a conception ot pragmatism both as a method and aa a theory ot truth which
wa. complete in all essential respects.- 50 Saum proves his thesis
by citing passages in James's ear11er writings which are similar,
almost verbatim at timea, to the main characteristics ot James's
later pragmatis•• 51
Pragmatl.m add. two important contributions to Jameats metaPtt7aiC8 ot experience: the criterion of meaning, and the theory ot
truth.

Eaoh ot the.e will be discu.sed brietly 1n turn.

Jame. state. that -the pragmatic method is primarily a method
of settling metaphysical dispute. that otherwise might be interminable. • • • ~t8 duty is) to interpret eaoh notion by tracing 1ts
practioal oonsequence'e ft52 We saw betope that a concept's meaning
1

was involved with the fringe ot the ooftcept--the tendency toward
future aotion and pract1cal consequence..

In order tn.t the mean-

ing ot the ooncept be judged correct, it 1. neoessary to t1nd out
whether the practical con.equence. intended are the actual cons.-

S~aurice Saua, "The Development ot Jame.'s Pragmatism Prior

to 1879," Journal 2! PhilosophI, XXX (January 19, 1933), 50.

51Ct• a.am'. article reterred to above tor a complete working
out ot his comparison ot Jamests earlier writing to thoae ot his
later pragmatism, pp. 43-51.
S2wl111am Jame., Pragmati.m, ed. Ralph Barton Perr1 (New York.
1947), p. 45.

r
queuc.s worked out.

This 1s done when the concept 1. put to work

in tbe stream ot experience.

As a canon ot meaning, therefore, the

pragmat1c method is necessary, because only 1n the stream ot expel'lenee, whicb is the ultimate rea11ty, 1s tbere true meaningtulness.
Ooncepts, being cuts or excerpts from the stream, need this criterion to pass judgment on their meaning.
The pragmatic crIterion ot meaning vas used only to penetrate
the meaningfulne.s of concepts.

Jame. proposed b1s theory ot

truth •• a crIterion of their truthfulness.
Por a pragmatist, "true

Id.a~ ~

."lldate, corroborate, !!lS. veri!}:_"S)

those

~ ~ ~

assimilate •

Ooncepts, standing &ll')ne,

.eleoted trom the stream are neither true nor talse.

In order to

judge the truth ot a concept, one must test the intended truth in
its re.ults 1n the stream ot experience.
that "truth bappens to an idea.
eyent..

Its .,er1ty

~

Tbat is why Jame. writes

It b:ecomes true, i. made true b,.

in tact an event, a process, the process

namel,. ot Terit7ing Itselt, its .,eritioatlon.

Its Talidit,. is tbe

process ot 1ts va11datiop.·S4 It is clear, tberetore, that pragmatism, as Perry sugge.ts, otfers radical empiricism a metaphysics ot
truth and meaning.

In this chapter we haye seen the development of James's phil.sophical thought beginning with the problems he saw in psychology

S3Jame., Meanini .2! Trutb.. pp. v-Ti.
S4:r'bid., p. v1.

r
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and progressing to his adoption or pure experience a8 the basic
realit7.

The specitic problem ot the conoept was only one or manT

that initiated Jamea'a philosophioal quest.

However, we have seen

hints ot his solution to this speoitio problem ot oonoept when
James disou8sed the continuity ot the stream and pragmatism.

It

has been necessar,. to give a rather rull treatment to this entire
philosophioal development since many ot the ideas considered enter
into James's oomplete resolution or the problem ot the conoept
which will now be oonsidered in the next ohapter.

r
OHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPT RESOLVED BY PURE EXPERIENOE
Once James had comm1tted h1mself to pure exper1ence as the
ultimate metaphysical realit7. he determined to work out a complet
system.

His death in 1910 prevented him from tinishing his pro-

posed s7nthesis.

His nephew, HeDr1 Jamea, Jr., however, edited

the manuscripts James had prepared.

2! PhilosoePl.
In !2!! Problems 2! Philosophl.

These are presented under the

title Some Problems

James returned to the problem

ot the perceptual and conceptual worldS.

He telt he now bad a

tirm metaphysioal baais on which he could resolve tbe apparent
d1tterences ot these two world..

With confidenoe be rejeoted the

traditional intellectualist doctrine

o~

concepts.

The he

~roc.eded

to till out and enrich the notion of concept he bad presented 1n
the Princ1ples.
The discus.ion ot the concept 1n this chapter will deal vith
(1) James's rejection ot traditional dootrines on the concept, (2)
his development ot the origin, character, and tunction ot the concept, ()

the conclusions James draws trom hi. new anairsi. ot the

concept.
Jamel claimed that Plato was the originator ot the intellec-

66
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tnalist doctrine, when he

~first

thought ot concepts as torming an

entlre17 separate world and treated this as the only object tit
tor the stud7 ot immortal minds."l

Thls Platonic influence carrie~

on throughout philosophy w1th the tendency to treat conception as

more easential in knowledge than perception.

Thes. philosophers,

under the guidanoe ot Plato, considered the sen•• s as organs ot

illusion and sensation as obscure and contused.

"This," clal••

James, "is the traditional intellectualist oreed."2

James thought he round the souroe of this Intellectualism in
the uncritical babit ot defining.

"Whenever we conceive a thing

we detine it; and it we still don't understand, we define our detinition.")

This habit ot deflnition led the intellectualist philo-

sophers farther and farther trom the immedlate stream ot
ence rrOQ which the concept was originally taken.

e~epl

When tho habit

of derining has oarried these philosophers tar afield, ther blame,
•

not the concepts, but the perceptual t1ux.

They even go so tar as

to den, the perceptual part ot experienoe. and oonstruot an artlticlal struoture by whioh they can explain thought and

knowledge~

Beoause ot this artificial structure, James rejected the dootrine.

ot Kant, Bradley, are.n, nnd ROTce. 4
lWll11am James, Some Problems ot Philosophy, ed. Henr7 James,

Jr. (New York, 1940),-P;-7~.

..........

2Ibid •
3Ibid., 83.

4Ibid., 84-85.

--
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Apart from James'e rejection of traditional dootrines because
of their artificial structures. he had positive reasons for rejecting this emphasis on concepts which he thought to be excessive.
In presenting these positive reasons he brought up the precis.
paints ot conrllct between the perceptual and conceptual worlds.
The main

d1~ference

betweon percepts and concepts is that

"percepts are continuous and concepts are discrete.
in their being. for conceptIon as an

~

Not discrete

is part ot the tlux ot

teeling, but discrete trom each other in their several meanings.">
In conoeption, a part ot experienee is isolated and distinguished
from the other parts ot experience.

It that aam. part is looked

.t perceptually. it has no meaning and is "found to telescope and
compenetrate and dittuse into its nelghbors, n6 When James 8.18
that concepts are not discrete 1n their being, he is pointing to
his solution of the problem of concepts.

As an act, conception is
"

~art

of experience.

~e1ng
~

Since the act of conceiving constItutes the

ot the concept, rather than its meaning, it Is Just as much

part ot the stream ot experienee .s the percept is.
Because ot the discreteness of their meaning, concepts are

"torever inadequate to the ruln.ss ot the realitr to be known. w7
~ealit1

eonsists ot existential partioulars as well as of essenees,

5Ibid.,

48. Compare James:. !

6Ib1d., 49-$0.
7Ib14 •• 78.

_P_lu_r_a_l_i_s_t_l~e Universe, pp. 282-2

8.

r
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and uniyersals.

This total reality is known only in the perceptual

In order to prove the priority ot sensation, or peroeption.,

flux.

James proposed to prove that concepts were inadequate and that the,
talsified the total reali

t,._

Theae two points will b e discusse.d

before Jamests positive oharaoteristios ot oonoeption are considered.
OonQeption is a secondary prooess whioh presupposes perception.

ttTo understand a ooncept you must know what it means.

It

means always some this, or aome abstract portion ot a this, with
which we first made acquaintanoe in 'the perceptual world. ft8 Betore any conoeption is possible, there must be perception.
says that "all eonceptual oontent is borrowed."9

Jame.

Even if one con-

siders oonceptions arising from previous conceptions, the original
concepts wero direotly from peroeptual eXperienoe.
.eoondary formationa, concepts
ness

or

arei.Jlfl~~quate

Thus, being

to express the tuI-

reality.

Since concepts lire inadequate, the aspect they give
ity is

d18to~ted.

or

real-

They leave out part ot the peroeptual flux by

their very nature.

This has led philosophers, erroneously, to
reje:::t the perceptual flux a8 unreal. 10 James attz-1butea two reasona for the inadequacy of conception.

8Ib1d.,

19.

9I !?14_

lOIbld., 80.81.
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When concepts are subst1tuted tor percepts, their relationa
are substituted also.

"But since the relations ot concepts are ot

statio comparison only, it is impossible to substitute them tor the
d)'llamic relations with which the perceptual flux 1s tilled. nil

hett

though the concept might designate a part ot the flux that was active, the oonoept remains or an intrinsically stationary nature
does not change even though its terms symbolize changing

~hich

originals.
The second reason ror the inadequacy of conception 1s that
"the conoeptual 8obeme,cons1sting as it does of discontinuous
terms. can only cover the perceptual flux in spots and 1noomplet••
17."12 Concepts are the substantive parts

or

the rlux and they

rail to represent the transitive teatures which are so 1mportant.
James liked to compare the conceptucl system to a map.

!are the oities marked on the map, but: theY' are worthless

Concepts
~~thout

-

the oonnecting roads and highways which represent the perceptual
~low

or

experience.

In James·s mind concepts and percepts are "so interlaced, and
~~

lif. rests on them so

interohangea~ly

that it is otten dIfficult to impart
~otion

ot the ditterence meant."

_.,.
- 47.

llIb1d

12Ibid •

llIbid ••

81.

and undiscrlminatingly,

quickl~

to beginners a clear

13 He found them so entwIned that

r
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It ¥as dltticult to speak ot one without bringing In the other.

It

1. neoess&r7, theretore, in our disoussion to proceed oautiously
To achieve our pur-

in order to get the proper notlon ot ooncept.

pose, we will div1de thls .econd part ot our discusslon, the develop.ent ot the conoept, into a treatment ot the origln, oontent
funct10n, value, and purpose of the concept.
present James's tlu1 .tatement

OD

and

Finally, we ., will

the concept.

In the act ot oonoe1ving, the mind, through attention, •• leota certain objeot. trom the

percept~l

tlux ot experlence.

the m1nd lWIe. and Identitles these objecta.

It .a78

Then

".!!!!i eaoh

part ot the .enslb1e continuum ia, and all the.e ab.tracted what.

J....

are concepts."14
When

discu•• e. the content and the tunction ot the oon-

oept, he u.e. the conoept ot man a. an example.

He .a78 this OOn-

oept, and all ooncepta, "1. three thing.: 1, the word ItseltJ 2,
"

a vague plcture ot the human torm whioh has It. own value In the

wa7 ot beauty or not, and ), an Inatrument tor .,mbollsing certain
objeota trom wh10h we __,. expect human treatment when oooa.lon arrive •• HIS The vague torm 1. the nuoleus or topic ot the conoept.
Thia 18 the part iao1ated trom the flux and named.
the oonoept 1. about.

!his ls what

Ho matter how valuble thi. part -7 be,

"the more important part of ita !lhe oonoepttiJ .1gnltio~~e ma,.
141h14.,

so.

151b14.,

S8.

r
12
naturallr be held to be the consequenoes to which it lead..
may lie either in the way ot making

u.

The.e

thInk, or 11'1 the way ot mak-

Whoever bas a clear idea ot these knows .flectlyelf
what the ooncept practically signltie•• ftl6 Thus J .... insists that
ing us act.

the tunotional value of the conoept Is more important than the
content.
The funotional aape.t ot concepta, whioh lead ua to think or
to act, receIve. Ita value trom the tact that concepts oan be IUb-

stituted tor percepts.

In tact, most adults spend their time in

this substItution prooess.
A.~lt

"The intellectual lit• .2! .an consists

wholll !!. h!!. substitution

2!.

~

conceptual order lS?!:. !h!.

peroeptual order ~ which h!! experience 01'1811'18111 comes."l7
ThPoUSh thi8 8ubstitution man 18 led to concepts ot a higher order
and to a tuller latelleotual lIte.
Oonoepts are

.0 frequent in adult lite that they appear as

tralns--each one is discrete. but ooupled with the next by a relationship tound in the tringe of eaoh.

Just as the mind, through

attention, s1ngled out oertain parts ot the perceptual tlow. so It
singles out parts ot the conceptual train.

Thi. is the orlg1n ot
concepts ot a hIgher order ot abstractness. l8
Because ot the power ot manta mind to discern and single out

17Ib1d., S1.
l6Ib1d ., S9.

-

18 Ib1d •

,I

I
i

r
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thele

high.~

concepts, there is no llmit to what can be conceived.

When new relationl are touad between these conoeptl, ne" worlds of
knowledge &rise.

Theae new relatlons enable man to .et up various

loheme. of tlxed order, such aa we have in mathematlc. or other
8.prlori scienoe..

James would gl". va11d1t,. to thls proce.s, In-

liltlng that "tbe terma are indeed man-made, but the order, being
established sole17 b7 compariaon, 1. flxed by the nature ot the
terms on the one hand an4 by our power ot percet...ing relationa on·
the othe~.1t19
James realized that th1s was -the way man's mind dealt with the
reallt1 presented to It.

Man's understanding ot "any mass ot per-

ceptual tact consiata in assimilatlng 1ts concr.te terms, one bJ
one, to so many term. ot the conceptual series, and then in assumiag, that the relations lntultlvely tound among the latter are
wbat connect the tormer_ n2O

Thls inducti.e-hJ'pothesls method,

who •• value he bad learned trom his early scientltic tralning,
Jamel attributed to oonoeption.

ThroUSh lt there 1s a theoretlc

conquest ....er the order 1n wbich. nature originally comes.

It alao

brings "the revelation ot a deeper level ot rea11ty ln thlngs_

Be-

ing more constant, it i8 truer, leis 111ua0PJ' than the perceptual
order, and ought to oommand our attent10n .ore."21

19]:b14., 69.
20Ibi!., 70.

211b1je, 11.
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conceptI have a aecond value beaidel that ot knowledge of a
higher order.

TheT help man to revalue his life.

lames oompare.

their relation to peroepts with the relation of sight to touch.
Through light man is prepared tor the things with which he must
come into contact.

Likewise, concepts prepare man tor his future

lit. in the perceptual tlux of experience.

This toreknowledge

gives meaning to life, it arouses "new feelings of sublimity, poweri and admiration, new interests and motivatlons.- 22
80

t8~

in discussing the positive development ot James's no-

tion ot concept, we have treated the origin, content and function,
and the value of oonception.

Now we must discuss its purpose.

Despite the excellence of its SUbstitutional value .. the primary purpose ot conception is to guide man in his lite in the per-

ceptual world ot experience.

The conceptual world opens up the

tut1,lPe ot the pel'oeptual world and helps to give it

meani~.

Con-

"

caption helps man to harness perceptual reality so that he can
guide it in his own interests.

"With concepts," James writes, "we

~o

in quest ot the absent, meet the remote, actively turn this wal

or

that, bend our experience, and make it tell us whither it is

~ound.

We change its order, run it backwards, bring tar bits to-

~8ther

and separate near bits, jump about over its lurtace instead

pf plowing through its oontlnult7, string its items on as many ide.
ilil diagrams as our mind oan .frame.

All these are way. ot handliB6

75
the peroeptual flux and •• eti91 dietant parts ot it."

23

Thus con-

ception t s priaary .funotion is to adapt lIan prac'i.;ical11 to the totalit1 ot the perceptual world in which he liye ••
In the last analysis, man needs both percepts and concepts
for the oompleteness ot his lite.

Thor must work together.

They

"interpenetrate and melt together, impregnate and fertilize eaoh

other.

~e

Neither, taken along,

~novs

realit,. in its completeness.

need them both, a8 W& need both our legs to walk With_ ft24

concludes
~bil.

br

J ....

"allowing oonceptual knowledge to be selt-suffioing,

at the same t1me • • • maintaining.that the full value of

such knowledge i8 got on1, by combining it with perceptual reality

&g&1n.,,25
Now that Jamssfs reJeotion ot the traditional doctrines on
oonoept and tho positive develop.ent of his own doctrine have been
discussed, it is necessary to turn to:: the third and final part ot
"

his discussion ot the concept.

"

Once he felt that his position had

been established, there were a number ot concluaions which tlowed
from this.

We will now discuss eaoh of these conclusions a8 they

appeared to James.

Jame. telt that his sattstactory explanation ot conception
and his rejection ot intellectualism

2lI bld., 64.

24,oid., 52-53.

2Stb1d ., S8.

oont1~ed

bis adoption ot em-
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piriciam.

This is the first and primary corollary that James

thought followed

~rom

his preoeding analysis of the concept.

WItb empiric1sm fontirmed, novelty in the universe becomes
possible,.

"In human experience the parts are percepts, built out

into wholes by our conceptual additions.

The percepts are singu-

lars that change Incessantl1 and never return exaotly as they were
belore.

This brings an element of concrete novelty lnto our ex-

perl.nee."

26 Here again James stresses the primaoy ot the percep-

tual world and sensation.

He admits that concepts are useful, but

the,. "can never .fitl,. supersede perception_"27
'lhls does not mean, however, that concepts and their relations
are not just as real, in their own wa,., as percepts are.
Jame.'. third oonclusion.
~eal

Th1. 1.

He goes on to define what he means b,.

as "anything 1s real ot whioh we tind ourselves obliged to

take account in &n7 way."~8
that conoepts must be real.
~hioh

With sueh a definition, it is clear
"
"

However, he warns that

realit7

concepts enjoy is inferior to that ot percepts, because it

is so static and schematic and laoks many
~hich

th~

or

the oharacteristics

peroeptual reality enJo78.

A fourth conclusion is that the self-sameness of ideal object.
~s oonti~ed.

A concept, by its ver7 nature, alwaTs means the same

261'01d• , 98.
27Ibltd.t, 100.

281bide', 101.

11
thing.

"On this selt-sameness of oonceptua1 objects tne statio

and 'eternal' oharacter ot our systems ot ideal

t~uth

is based:

for a relation, once peroelTed to obtain, must obtain always, between terms that do not a1ter."29

He denies the nominalist posi-

tion that a ooncept, used in different contexts as intrinsically
the same, 1s only a

n~,e.

He says that the ooncept "same" means

"either (a) that no difterence can be round between • • • two objects when compared, or (b) that we can substitute the one tor
the other in oertain operations with,ut 3hanging the result.")O
James felt that many philosophers contused a ooncept of the "same"
with the same physioal qualitr.

For example, these philosophers

did not thlnk the wh1teness ot the snow, taken as a physioa1 prop-

erty, could be the same as the whiteness of paper.

James conolude.

that "our meanings can be the same as often as we intend to have
them so, quite irrespective of whether what is meant by a physioal
possibility or not.")l
What James is trying to affirm in this notion of the seltsameness ot ideal objects is "the platonic doctrine that conoepts
are singulars, that oonoept-stuff 18 inalterable, and that Pb7sioal rea11ties are oonstituted by the Tarious
which they 'partake. t

29Ibld., 102.

30lbld., 10).
3l~., lO~.

c~noept-stutrs

of

It is known as flogical realism- in the
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history ot Philosophy.".3 2

James admitted that this ma.y seem con-

tradictory tor an empiricist, but 141a purpose

w~s

"to combine logi-

cal realism with an otherw1se empi:r'ioiat mode ot thought. ,,3.3

Jam$S'S tinal conclusion is that concepts and percepts are
consubstantial; that is, "'I;hey are made of the same kind of. sturr,
anJ melt into each othel~ -;.,rhen we handle th.em t03ether. ".34

It 1s

ditl"ieult, he contends, to tell how llluch of: mants mental life 1s
gotten trom sense and h("w liluch trom conception.
uses both, and they both interact on him.

"two mental tunotions thus play into

eac~

l1an oonatantly

He claims that thtlse

otherta hands.

Per-

oeption prompts our thought It and thought in turn enl'iches our perception.

The mora we see, the more we think; while the

more we

think, the more we Boe in our immediate experiences. and the greater grows

th~

detail and th6 more significant

th~

articulateness

ot our perception. n3S
With these oonclusions whioh James draws trom his tinal ex-

planation of concept, as

enrl~hed

by

pU1~e

exporience, We finish

our exposition of James's notion of concept as tound in his psy-

onalogical and philosophical writings.

In the last ohapter, a tew

oonolusions must be drawn and a tew observntions made.

-

34Ibid .,

107.

.35Ibld~. 108-109.

CRAPTER V
SOME CONCLUSIONS AND OBSIRVATIONS
Bow that we baTe discussed James's notion ot the concept as h'
presented and deyeloped it in his ps,.chology and philosoPDJ. we
might ask how James's notion ot the conoept compares with the traditional scholastic notion.

It vould see. that James was anti-

scholastic in .s much as he considered Icholastic1.. as a torm ot
the intellectualil. which he had rejected.

The discussion will be-

gin with a prelim1&r7 comment on the teleological purpose ot concept in James, then one major point ot comparison will be discussed
ThPoughout his development ot the notlon ot concept, James
Insisted that

it is a teleological instrument and that it is more
",

important tunctionall,. than as a

conte~t.

The main reason" tor

thls .eems to be James's denial ot the power ot the mind to grasp
reallt,. in its completeness.

"We have," be wrote, "no organ or

tacult7 to appreclate the simpl,. given order.

The real world as it

is given objeotivel,. at this moment Is the sum total ot all Its
belngs and eTent. now ••.•• It i. an order with which ve have
nothing to do but to get avay trom it as fast as possible. nl

~

lWilliam James, "Reflex Action and Thelsm," EssaXI on Faith
Moral" &4. aalph Barton Perr,. (lev York, 1941), pp.-r18-11Q.
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There aeem to be two reaaoDa tor this denial.

Jame.'a acien-

titic background, with ita evolutionary tendencies, made hi. se.
the world ot knowl.dge evolYing to a more and more pertect atate.
Whatever is known is juat a portion ot all there ia to be known.
Though knowledge mA7 increaae and become morepertect, there will
a1w&71 be more which the mind can never tull, ....p.
Jamelta peraonal experienc.a, also, prepared him tor thil denial.

In his earl, tite he could not aasimilate, intellectuall"

the problems and triala he experienoed.

As a result ot these, he

developed the notion ot the "will to believe."

This was an admis-

.1on that certain problem. could not be solved intellectuall" but
had to be taken to the VolItional level In order that man could
assimilate the. into hls dal1, lite aati.tactor117.
Oon.equant on this denial ot the power ot the mind, Jam.1
subordinated intellect to wlll.

In order that man live harmoniOUI,

.

17 in thl1 world and control it, as mUOh as he could, James bad to
on a principle other than tntellect.

~e17

tance, theretore, to the will.

ae gave primar, impor-

Thus knowledge and the concept be.

came teleological inatruments lubordlnated to the command of the
,ersonal intereats of the will.
With priaac, given to the teleological aspect ot the concept,
~ames

mitigated the content ot the concept.

~ealt

t.portant part ot the concept, and he ne.er aeemed to glYe

~

Por him this vaa the

olear notion of just what the content ot the concept should be.

~hls

vasueDess leads UI to a consideration ot Jamestl metbod in
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developing the notion ot the concept, and tinally a comparison ot
his method with the scholastic method.
fbro~gh

introspection and descr1ptive psychology Jame. con-

sidered the concept as a retlex percept.

fhe mind singles it out

ot the stream ot thought and 1dentitiel 1t as being the aame as a
previous thought.

Once singled out, the concept can be separated

trom the context w1th which it was received by the conoentration

ot attention.

Finally, with the expansion ot conoentration to the

fringe tendencies, the concept can become univerltal or particulu.
fhia, 1n general, would be the method ot descriptive pSl0hologr_

Once tbe oonoept is singled out, it could be considered. a

name tor various members ot a class, 1t could be considered as a
qualitl which is found in various individuals; or It could be
considered as the basic concept-atutt which other being. participate.
Prom hia uae of thia method, Jame. did arrive at some philosophical notion 01' the concept.
all els., ot pure experienoe.

It waa a piece, a part along with
Though it talsitled reallty to a

degree, It was a necelearl instrument in ahaping the rich variety

ot realltl in pure experienoe.

Pinally, it vas ins.parably oon-

nected with the percept and the perceptual tlux.
J.an Wahl oonoludes trom thl. that "J.... is a nominalist, a
conoeptualist, and a realist in turn.

He i8 a nominalist in the

sense that the 'particular concrete' alone possesses protound trut
and real worth tor hlm.

I

He i8 a oonceptualist in the sense that.

I
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1n his mind, there exists around our particular ideas a fringe of
general meaning, and, on tne other hand, that there is a certain
element ot generality in things."2

In Jame.'s aftirmation that

"conoept-stuft is inalterable, and that physical realities are
constituted by the various concept-stutts ot which they partake.")
Wahl sees him as a realist •

.

The scholastic notion ot the ooncept, on the other hand, 1s de.
veloped philosophioally and with a philosophical method.

It is

tirmly rooted in a basic metaphysios and theory ot knowledge that
are based on tirst principle. ot being and knowledge.

That the

mind can know and attain truth and tberebr gain a certain Mastery

over the world of being is one ot its primary and undeniable principles.

Jam•• tried to u •• an inverse prooe •• and attempted to

build a metaphysics and theory ot knowledge trom the problems he
recognized in de.oriptiye psroholoQJ·. but ne oould not crolla the
"
"

bridge between scientitic and philosophical psyolwlogr successtul-

11, though he realized there was a bridge to be crossed.
In oonclusion, James held tenaciously to the traditional notions and validity ot conoeptual knowledge.

ae enriched and d.ten-

ded the notion of conoept against the scientific and philosophical
misoonceptions about it 1n hi. day.

In tact, it would •••• that

James would hay. aooepted the scholastic notion ot the ooncept it
2Jean Wahl, The Pluralist P~loso2hie. ot Ensland and Amerioa,
trans. Fred Rothwerr (tondon, -14 ), p. 11>0.-

",bid., 161.
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he had known what it was in a more speoific way, and if he had not
rejected it as a part of other intelleotualist theoPies.
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